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Abstract  
Natural resource-based industries are in economics often is understood as being unable to stimulate 
growth and development. The latter point has been put forward in the form of the ‘resource curse’ 
and is epitomised by inter alia Reinert (2007) who sees natural resource-based industries as 
detrimental to growth and development. Still, it will be argued here that Reinert’s approach is 
unsuitable for grasping the full role of natural resources in economic development because 
important aspects of industrial dynamics are ignored. In pursuit of the latter research aim two topics 
in economic research will be integrated: (i) the area of learning, innovation, capability building and 
economic development; (ii) with the area of natural resources and economic development. Such 
integration will be a contribution to both topics.  
 
Hence, this paper seeks to address the question: how can we understand the role of natural resources 
in the process of economic development from a learning perspective? The latter is sought answered 
by use of logic and historical examples of natural resource-based development. The tentative 
answer given is that natural resources must be understood as dynamic, and as being subject to 
learning processes of natural resource creation, extension and obsolescing that are enabled or 
blocked by institutions. 
 
Keywords: 
Natural resources; development; learning perspective; structural change; institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Globelics 2011  draft 
 
2 
 
 
1. Introduction  
As a basic point of departure this work shares the views of Kenneth Boulding on economic 
production and development. Boulding himself described the essence of his work with a remarkable 
study anecdote: "my Oxford philosophy tutor, who had the curious habit of crawling under the table 
while giving his tutorials, commented in a high British voice coming from underneath the table on a 
paper I had given on evolution, 'It is all very well to talk about evolution, Mr. Boulding, but what 
evolves, what evolves, what evolves? After 40 years I have at least a glimmering of the answer. 
What evolves is something very much like knowledge" (Boulding 1978, p. 33).  
 
A learning perspective 
 
The economic impact of learning in production often takes the form of innovations that are to be understood as 
‘something’ qualitatively novel in its context. Learning is here understood in a broad sense; as a process leading to new 
knowledge, to new combinations of old knowledge, or to putting old knowledge into new heads (Johnson 1992). There 
is a selection mechanism that implies that not all knowledge is equally useful in an economic sense. Therefore not all 
learning processes leads to innovation, but innovation is not possible without learning activities. If one sees 
development as a process that involves creation of new resources, knowledge and activities, it must necessarily involve 
innovation – thus innovation and development are in fact inseparable concepts. The latter implies that human learning 
is the main source of economic development, and that to understand development it is necessary to understand the 
process of innovation.  
 
Text Box 1: A learning perspective. 
 
The point is made more explicit in his view of the production process. Boulding (1981) argues that 
economic production should be seen as a process that requires energy, material and knowledge. The 
production process consists of processing and transforming material and in the process adding value 
to it – this process requires knowledge, energy, space and time. The processing is planned according 
to available knowledge, and there are feedback loops between the factors in the process (e.g. 
material processing and knowledge or between energy scarcity and knowledge) which can be called 
learning. Boulding perceives material, energy, time and place as ‘limiting factors’, without which 
production would not be possible, while knowledge is the ‘enabling factor’ of the process because it 
coordinates the limiting factors. Consequently, economic development can be seen as a process of 
learning where knowledge is accumulated, and products and production processes are qualitatively 
changed. The materials and energy required to produce an iPhone were present on the planet 100 
years ago, but the knowledge was not. Given the enabling importance of knowledge in 
development, processes of learning are placed at the centre of economic development – such an 
approach can thus be labelled a ‘learning perspective’, cf. Text Box 1. The above perception of 
production also illustrates that factors of production are interdependent, and thus that economic 
performance is a systemic phenomenon. Moreover, the learning feedback mechanisms in 
production are most often supported/blocked by the given institutional set-up which is thus 
important for knowledge accumulation, and ultimately development; cf. text box 2 for definitions.  
 
Institutions: definition, distinctions and learning  
 
I will follow the definition of institutions given by Edquist and Johnson (1997) that see institutions as sets of common 
habits, routines, established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and 
groups. A main point is that institutions provide an incentive structure for human behaviour, which in turn will 
determine the attainable economic outcome in a given context (Sokoloff and Engerman 2003). This structuring view of 
institutions underlies the often-used phrase that institutions are the rules of the game. The latter can be misleading 
because institutions have a broader impact. They are e.g. also about how to change the rules, about whether the rules 
are followed and how they are sanctioned, the nature of the players, and the normative purpose of the game. Hence, 
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institutions influence human behaviour, but institutions can also be influenced and changed by human behaviour. In its 
most basic form institutions are social norms and habits that emerge in all social groups. Such basic social rules are 
sources of information with respect to predicting the behaviour of other people - such that we do not need to start from 
scratch every day. The regulation of social behaviour supplies stability to societies – a stability that is mandatory for its 
reproduction (Johnson 1992).  
 
Given this definition, institutions obviously constitute a very complex network of norms and rules. Hence, a basic 
typology could be helpful. I will mention two useful distinctions. (i) Organisations and institutions should be seen as 
distinct although they interact and affect one another. Organisations are actors such as firms, universities and states. 
Institutions on the other hand influence how actors behave. Institutions either develop spontaneously without specific 
purpose, or are deliberately designed – the state is an important ‘rule-setter’. Policy can be defined as purposeful 
institutional change. Thus, in such cases policy and institutional change are indistinguishable. Organisations are in 
principle always created with a purpose where e.g. firms seek profits (Edquist and Johnson 1997). (ii) Institutions can 
be divided into formal and informal. Formal institutions are typically viewed as rules and laws. They have been written 
down, are visible and easy to codify, and can be easily expressed and explained to others. Thus, formal institutions are 
explicit in nature. Informal institutions are the unwritten common practices of a society such as common law, norms, 
traditions and customs that are usually non-explicit in nature. These two types of institutions are seen as interacting, 
complementary and interdependent. 
 
Institutions can influence learning activities in a number of ways that are relevant for understanding the process of 
development. Hodgson (1998) argues that information is always culturally processed because institutions (as informal 
cultural rules) will undoubtedly influence the way people perceive the world, its problems and potential solutions. 
Thus, informal institutions make up a social filter for basic cognition and information processing, which implies that 
institutions influence ideals and values in societies (Johnson 1992). Closely related to the latter, one can argue that the 
incentives to engage in learning have a social aspect. Also, these attitudes and ideals are important for legitimising 
learning policies (Arocena and Sutz 2000b). Formal institutions also influence the incentives for learning e.g. via 
education policy and pecuniary incentive structures for learning efforts (e.g. appropriability). These ‘structural 
features’ are thus likely to influence the ‘learning behaviour’ of individuals and firms in processes of economic 
development. The institutions affecting learning can thus be called ‘learning institutions’. Also, the alteration of 
institutions in pursuit of stimulating learning and development can be called ‘institutional learning’.  
 
Text Box 2: Institutions: definition, distinctions and learning. 
 
The topic of natural resources and development also holds significant non-academic relevance. 
According to Ross (1999) twenty-seven of the thirty-six states in the World Bank’s most troubled 
category – severely indebted low-income countries – are primary commodity exporters. A better 
understanding of the role of natural resources in development could have far reaching consequences 
for such countries. Moreover, the issue of natural resources and development is currently an 
extremely interesting topic because the world is witnessing a ‘new scramble for natural resources’. 
Developed countries have realised that knowledge is not sufficient to thrive in the knowledge 
economy – natural resources are a necessary foundation for production and consumption – as 
pointed out by Boulding. Concerns about climate change and global warming have generated an 
overall search for ‘greener’ and energy-efficient solutions, and our current era seems to have a 
‘green’ window of opportunity including bio-energy, bio-materials and other “green’ solutions. 
Many natural resource-based industries can also be characterized as biomass industries, and they are 
currently receiving renewed attention due to their future potential. For the same reason we are also 
witnessing increasing land purchases in Africa by China and other countries (Knaup and 
Mittelstaedt 2009). Thus, there are many interrelated issues that are tied together by land, and land’s 
ability to produce biomass. A learning approach to natural resources has the potential to cast light 
on how less developed countries can or ought to respond to the increased demand for their natural 
resources.  
 
Globelics 2011  draft 
 
4 
 
In the literature on natural resources and economic development there are broadly speaking two 
different understandings of the relationship between natural resources and development. Some 
argue that exploitation of natural resources has and can stimulate emergence of several other types 
of activities via linkages such as services and manufacture, and via a process of diversification of 
the economy generate economic development. It is thus argued that natural resources in certain 
circumstances are an advantage (Innis 1930; Watkins 1963). Others argue that natural resources 
often are harmful for, or at least can not stimulate, economic development because they are subject 
to a ‘pathological disorder’ (Gunton 2003). Natural resources are consequently seen as a 
disadvantage – a position which has given rise to the term ‘resource curse’ (see e.g. Sachs and 
Warner 1995; Auty 2001).  
 
As a representative for the latter view Reinert (2007) argues that natural resource-based industries 
in general, and agriculture in particular, are subject to decreasing returns to scale, have very few 
linkages, that innovation and learning is scarce, and that specialisation in these industries is 
equivalent to specialising in poverty. Policy consequences of the latter obviously are that natural 
resource-based industries should be abandoned in favour of more developmental industries. 
Reinert’s (2007) position is in line with a large part of economic theory because it is a fundamental 
part of the dominating conceptual model of structural change and development. According to this 
model, structural change has followed a pattern where the role of natural resource-based industries 
has been diminishing which, for some, translates into that these industries are ‘bad’ for 
development. The latter establishes a connection between (a) perception of natural resources and (b) 
perception of economic development. The arguments put forward by Reinert (2007) and resource-
curse proponents will be scrutinised from a learning perspective to get a clearer picture of the 
relationships between natural resources and learning. In this process an explicitly ‘learning 
approach’ to natural resources will be presented. The latter opens up for the presentation of an 
alternative, conceptual model of structural change, which explicitly emphasises the links between 
natural resources, innovation and structural change. 
 
Discussions in the literature specifically on natural resources and development are according to 
Bridge (2008) currently in a stalemate. Recent debate has predominantly focused on the resource 
curse which suggests that successful natural resource-based development is an exception rather than 
the rule. Both proponents and critics of the potential for natural resource-based development agree 
that most unsuccessful cases of natural resource-based development can be explained by state 
failure. On the other hand they disagree on whether such failures are owed to context and 
contingency or to structural and deterministic features of natural resources. Irrespective of the latter, 
a consensus on policy has emerged between them; it is to focus on the capacity of the state which 
most often implies ‘good governance’ and ‘sound’ institutions (UNCTAD 2007). It is striking that 
the relations between institutions and learning is completely absent; just as the importance of 
context factors (Bridge 2008). A learning perspective on which kinds of institutions are needed to 
achieve natural resource-based development could be very fruitful. It could contribute to moving 
focus from ‘whether natural resources’ to learning and knowledge accumulation, and thus 
contribute to this discussion.  
 
Hence, this paper seeks to address the question: how can we understand the role of natural resources 
in the process of economic development from a learning perspective? The tentative answer given is 
that natural resources must be understood as dynamic, and as being subject to learning processes of 
natural resource creation, extension and obsolescing that are enabled or blocked by institutions. 
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The disposition of the paper is: (i) clarification of key terms used; (ii) natural resources in economic 
theory and the link to the understanding of structural change; (iii) natural resources as advantage; 
(iv) natural resources as disadvantage; (v) core issues and institutions; (vi) a learning approach to 
natural resources.  
 
2. Setting the Stage 
Natural resources  
In economic theory a resource is anything that can contribute to economic activity – an input to the 
production process. It is normal to distinguish between natural resources, human resources and 
capital. This rather broad and loose definition makes it difficult to draw a clear line between what 
constitutes a resource and what does not. In this understanding of resources it is clear that a resource 
only exists in relation to a social context of production – for example human skill is only a resource 
so far it contributes to production. Also, producers need knowledge about how to identify, acquire 
and apply a resource in order for it to actually be a resource. It is thus partly a social construct.   
 
In more common terms natural resources are, according to the Oxford dictionary of Economics, 
defined as factors of production provided by nature which includes agriculture, forestry and fishing, 
and extractive industries producing fuels, metals and other minerals. This is also the definition of 
the primary sector which is contrasted with the secondary sector, producing manufactures and other 
processed goods, and the tertiary sector producing services (Black 2003). A similar definition is 
used to investigate the link between natural resources and development in recent econometric 
exercises, cf. Text Box 3. 
 
Natural resource-based industries 
 
 Sachs and Warner (1997) define primary products or natural resource industries as “fuels” and “non-fuel primary 
products” from the World Data 1995. Non-fuel primary products corresponds to SITC categories 0, 1, 2, 4 and 68, and 
fuels corresponds to SITC category 3: 
• 0 - Food and live animals  
• 1 - Beverages and tobacco  
• 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels  
• 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  
• 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes  
• 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
 
Text Box 3: Definition of natural resource-based industries. 
 
According to Bakker and Bridge (2006) there are in social science, broadly speaking, the following 
different ways of perceiving natural resources: (i) they are completely exogenous to human activity 
and affect human activity, not vice versa; (ii) they are purely social constructs and human activity 
affects natural resources, not vice versa; and (iii) they are both – natural resources exist 
independently of humans but are only identified as resources, and thus ascribed value, in relation to 
human activities. Natural resources in a given context are likely to influence human behaviour but 
humans will also influence the ‘material world’. Branch (iii) can be characterized as a 
Realist/evolutionary perception of natural resources – one that will dominate this paper.  
 
The difference between the positions is of major importance. It is the difference between 
understanding natural resources as finite and exogenous, and as flexible and endogenous to the 
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economy. When seen as endogenous, the knowledge stock in a given country determines to which 
extent it is capable of identifying natural and energy resources. Such an understanding transforms 
natural resources from a static to a dynamic concept. For example oil and minerals have been in the 
earth’s crest as long as Homo sapiens have inhabited the planet, but it was only very recently that 
we identified oil as a valuable source of energy.  
 
Zimmermann (1972) points out that a natural resource is defined by its function. Coal is a resource 
in as much as it serves the function of generating energy for various operations. Without this 
function coal would still be coal, but it would not be a resource. These remarks open the floor for a 
conflict between the viewpoints of natural science and social science - “if nature is thought of as the 
universe, it may be considered constant…Nature in that sense is the topic of natural science. The 
social scientist is concerned, not with the totality of the physical universe, but with the meaning of 
nature for man, with that ever-changing portion of nature that is known to man and affects his 
existence. That portion is both expanding and contracting. It expands in response to increase in 
knowledge and improvement of the arts. Nature reveals herself gradually to man, but no faster than 
he can learn” (Zimmermann 1972: p. 80). It is therefore straightforward to denote the natural 
scientist’s view of nature as nature, and denote the social scientist’s view as natural resources 
(Wicken 2009). In the interface between nature and natural resources there are ongoing processes of 
resource creation, resource obsolescing and resource extension. The conversion process from nature 
to natural resources should be understood as part of the production of natural resources. 
 
Natural science (nature) Social  science (natural resources) 
Constants of natural science ‘relatives’ of social science 
The world a bundle of hay – zero sum game  Non zero sum game 
Natural resources are Natural resources become 
Abstract or physical perception of natural resources. 
Nature exists only because it exists, there is no function 
behind the existence of our planet and its characteristics.  
Functional perception. A natural resource is a mean to an 
end, an end defined by man and society, which makes it 
functional.   
Static perception of natural resources  Dynamic perception of natural resources 
Land supply is given and fixed Land: its function, yield and supply must be interpreted in 
relation to time, space and knowledge.   
Nature = natural resources  Nature is converted to natural resources in a process of 
learning and knowledge accumulation  
Table 2-1: Nature and natural resources. 
  
On the basis of the above natural resources are related to processes of identification, production, 
processing and use. All of these processes are coordinated by available knowledge, and are likely to 
be altered as a result of learning.  
Natural resource-based development 
Since the concept of natural resource-based development is central to this work it should be 
properly defined. Firstly it is relevant to consider how development or production can be based on 
something else. In the ‘Bouldingian’ view on the production process we operate with three factors 
of production; material, energy and knowledge. Every of these factors are required for production 
and can not be based on only one of them (which is also true for standard factors of production as 
labour and capital). The interdependency between factors of production implies that they can not be 
perfect substitutes for each other – that would be equivalent to making the same cake with half the 
natural ingredients but with two kitchens (Daly 1997), or making a product only using knowledge. 
Still, it can be meaningful to use the formulation ‘based on’ if one factor of production is dominant 
in a given setting.   
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From a learning perspective natural resource-based development must be a production process 
wherein a natural resource is the dominant factor of production, which over time stimulates 
processes of learning, innovation and competence building. In a straightforward way anyone can 
imagine that skill-development is required to hunt down a gazelle or make equipment to catch a 
fish. In such cases the presence of a natural resource stimulates learning that might be said to be 
natural resource-based. Also, it is likewise obvious that the absence of easy-accessible natural 
resources will stimulate learning in order to develop substitutes or find methods to get access to e.g. 
fish under ice. More contemporary arguments would be that the natural-resource rich Americas 
have an advantage over natural-resource poor Asia with respect to development, but the relative 
absence of natural resources in Asia has stimulated other types of activities that maybe are better in 
some sense. Thus, according to these simple examples both abundance and scarcity of natural 
resources can stimulate learning. It is therefore difficult to really argue that development in any 
sense can be based on natural resources. If based on anything at all, both processes of production 
and development are based on learning and knowledge accumulation; this is what evolves.  
 
Despite the difficulty of clear definitions, I will stick to the above definition of natural resource-
based development understood as types of production where a natural resource is the dominant 
factor of production, and that over time induces processes of learning and knowledge accumulation 
within and around the production. Moreover, types of production where a natural resource is the 
dominant factor of production qualify as a natural resource-based industry. In the following the 
types of production listed in the previous section will – even though not exhaustive – be the 
empirical definition of natural resource-based industry in the following. 
3. Natural resources in economic theory 
Naturally the perception of natural resources and their role in economic development has varied 
over time and across economic theories. I will in the following present a selection of contributions.  
 
An early influence on the link between natural resources and development was presented by 
Thomas Malthus (1798). As part of his work on population dynamics he argued that agricultural 
production was subject to decreasing returns to scale. The argument has two aspects: (1) good land 
is scarce and when inferior lands are included in production, as production increases, the yield per 
unit of land will gradually diminish; (2) since land is fixed in quantitative terms by nature, it will 
inevitably be subject to diminishing returns to scale as all land is used. Even though Malthus did not 
write explicitly on natural resources his understanding of them has influenced economic thinking to 
this day. It is the idea that natural resources, in general, are finite – and thus exhaustible, and thus 
subject to diminishing returns to scale. On the other hand, in manufacturing the intensive use of 
capital (machines can produce machines – land can not produce land) would generate increasing 
returns to scale, and facilitate capital accumulation1
                                                 
1 Returns to scale versus diminishing returns: ‘returns to scale’ refers to a situation where an increase in output is associated with a 
proportionate increase in input – this would be constant returns to scale. The point with this concept is that it concerns the 
‘whole scale’ – all inputs increase proportionally, and the derived effect on output decides whether we are talking about 
decreasing, increasing or constant returns to scale. ‘Diminishing returns’ concerns the change in output derived from a 
change in 1 factor of production while all other factors of production are held constant. It can be thought of as continuing 
adding an extra man to work a piece of land; at some point the extra benefit (return) of adding an extra man will start to 
diminish even though total output continues to increase. Malthus argued that because land is finite, then when all land is 
used, adding additional men to attend it will lead to diminishing returns on labour which in reality is caused by the finiteness 
of land. This is thus an indirect diminishing returns caused by natural resources. There is also a direct diminishing return to 
. 
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In the time before World War 2 access to and control of natural resources (as energy and material) 
was seen as mandatory for development and national wealth. Still, based on the analysis of Malthus, 
there was concern that land scarcity would prove a limit to growth. Most economists (in the pre-war 
era) were of the opinion that increased capital accumulation and technological progress would 
hinder land scarcity from becoming a constraint to global growth (Auty 2006). The latter is one 
reason why natural resources did not figure explicitly in the theoretical developments on economic 
growth at the time, as for example the Solow growth model (Solow 1957).  
 
It might be helpful to distinguish between dominant theoretical branches in the post war period, and 
their ideas about natural resources. I will follow Palma (2008a) and divide the area into three 
groups. The division is based on a distinction between sector (what you do - e.g. manufacture, 
primary production) and activity (how you do it - e.g. R&D, education). (1) The first group is made 
up by (mainly) neoclassical models of growth – a tradition started by Robert Solow. This group 
perceives the process of economic growth as both sector-indifferent and activity-indifferent. 
Problems are only defined as market imperfections and the market will know the answer. (2) The 
second group consists of models that are sector-indifferent but activity-specific. It is includes the 
work of Endogenous Growth Theory and Neo-Schumpeterians. Here R&D activities (knowledge 
production) are seen as stimulating the process of growth, but it is not related to any specific sector 
as e.g. manufacturing. (3) The third group (Neo-Keynesian, Schumpeterian and structuralist 
approaches) sees growth as both activity-specific and sector-specific (specific activities matter 
only/mostly in the sense that they are special for the sector in question). The growth process is 
about developing new activities and subsequently new sectors/industries. Especially manufacturing 
is thought to have special growth enhancing effects because ‘learning-by-doing’, dynamic 
economies of scale, increasing returns, externalities and spillover effects are more prevalent in the 
manufacturing sector than elsewhere in the economy (Palma 2008a).  Here, as opposed to groups 
(1) and (2), there is a direct link between economic performance and the size, strength and depth of 
the manufacturing sector. In groups (1) and (2) the role of natural resources is in principle not 
different from the role of any other factor of production nor is natural resource-based industry really 
different from other industries. Within group (3) sector differences are acknowledged, or put 
differently, the industrial structure and specialisation matters for economic performance, but the 
primary sector and natural resources are not seen as progressive areas.  
 
Group (3) has been the least dominant branch of theory in the post war years but was initially strong 
in development economics. It can be linked to what has been called “high development theory” 
(Krugman 1997). High development theory, whose prime was in the 1950s, argued that structural 
change (with manufacturing as engine) is the key parameter for explaining economic development2
                                                                                                                                                                  
land because the quality of it decreases with expansion. Hence, because of direct and indirect diminishing returns it is not 
possible to increase the ‘whole scale’ of factor inputs infinitely in agriculture. According to this line of thought agriculture is 
subject to both the law of diminishing returns and decreasing returns to scale. Even though this is on the limit of conceptual 
confusion, I will apply these terms in this chapter, because the scholars I cite apply them in this fashion. I will thus make 
liberal use of these concepts, but trust that misunderstandings have now been avoided. 
 
(Cimoli, Porcile et al. 2005). It is worth noting that development economics as a discipline was born 
in a period where many former colonies became independent nation states. Many of these new 
2 Famous authors related to this trend were inter alia Raul Prebisch, Albert Hirschman, Celso Furtado and Hans Singer. 
They argued that economic activities are qualitatively different and have different impacts in terms of growth potential, 
employment generation, value added and ability to generate increasing returns to scale. What these authors failed to 
acknowledge was that technical development does not happen automatically – it seems that they did not pay sufficient 
attention to the learning divide (Cimoli, Porcile et al. 2005).   
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states, and most Latin American countries, were rich in natural resources and at the same time had a 
variety of problems that at times could be related to this industry structure. Hence, development 
economics from its birth saw manufacturing as the engine of development (and industrialisation), 
while natural resource-based industry was seen as dangerous left-over from the colonial past 
(Singer 1950).  
 
The latter perception of natural resources (primary sector being very different from secondary 
sector) reflects a conceptual model of historical structural change and implicitly a theory of 
development. In the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Matsuyama (2008) defines structural 
change as: “a complex, intertwined phenomenon, not only because economic growth brings about 
complementary changes in various aspects of the economy, such as the sector compositions of 
output and employment, the organisation of industry, the financial system, income and wealth 
distribution, demography, political institutions, and even the society's value system, but also 
because these changes can in turn affect the growth processes”. Early work on structural change 
identified patterns of development followed by most countries. The conclusion was that: “as the 
economy grows, the production shifts from the primary to the secondary to the tertiary sector” 
(Matsuyama 2008). The main point is that the tripartite interpretation of structural change put 
forward here, implicitly states that economic development demands a similar pattern of structural 
change3
 
. Additionally the Oxford Dictionary of Economics states that the primary sector is usually 
most important in less developed countries (Black 2003). The implicit normativeness further 
cements the position of natural resource-based industry at the bottom of the hierarchy with respect 
to economic development.  
This perception of structural change is also supported by the findings of Kuznets (1971) who 
searched for characteristics of economic growth in the period between 1850 and 1950 in now-
developed countries4.  To get an overview of structural change he categorizes production in three 
sectors: (A) includes agriculture and related industries like fisheries, forestry and hunting; (I) 
includes mining, manufacturing, construction, electric power, gas and water, transportation, storage 
and communication; (S) includes trade, finance, insurance and real estate, income from dwellings, 
and a variety of personal, professional, recreational, educational and governmental services5
 
. As can 
be seen from the table below the shares of (A) and (I) changed significantly during the period.   
Sector Share of GDP 1850/1900 Share of GDP 1950 
A More than 40% Less than 10% 
I 22-25% 40-50% 
S No general trend besides a modest increase, especially in governmental services.   
Table 3-1 Structural Change in now developed countries. 
 
The majority of the increase in (I) was accounted for by manufacture (around 70%). Within 
manufacturing metal fabricating and chemical-petroleum branches rose conspicuously while 
industries in decline were textile and clothing, and wood and leather. In terms of employment the 
(A) sector went from employing 50-60% of the workforce in 1850 to employing 10-20% in the 
early 1960s. The share of the work force employed in sector (I) grew less than the fall in sector (A), 
hence sector (S) employed still more people. These large, but well-known, changes in production 
                                                 
3 Tripartite classification refers to the division of production into primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. 
4 15-18 Western European countries plus Japan 
5 This is classification is not identical to the tripartite classification discussed earlier though it is similar. In any case 
similarities between these classifications are not of relevance at this point.  
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structure and the high rate of growth of production per capita and productivity were historically fast, 
extensive and radical. 
 
In order to further analyse the pattern of structural change Kuznets (1971) focuses on the most 
dynamic sector (I) in economy of the United States in the period 1880 to 1948. He finds strong 
diversity in growth rates of different groups of manufacturing activities that he interprets to be 
consequences of technological change with the logic that economic growth is strongest in the 
industries with most innovation. From Kuznets’ seminal account of structural change and 
development it seems obvious to infere that innovation is the driver of growth, and that a large part 
of what I have defined as natural resource-based industries do not innovate, and therefore become 
less important. The latter forward statement touches upon a problem of separating the categories of 
production, cf. Text Box 4.   
 
 
 
The tripartite classification 
 
The classification most often used to find patterns of structural change in history is the tripartite classification. 
However, there have always been ambiguities regarding the demarcation lines between the primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors. For example, when reviewing problems of definition in Australia and New Zealand, Fischer (1939) 
explained that the basic idea is to draw a dividing line on the basis of ‘substantial alteration’ in form and character of 
primary materials. This was to be done through manufacturing operations where the end product would be classified as 
a secondary product. Still, as later observed by Fisher, it is not easy to determine the precise stage in the conversion of 
milk into butter or cheese when this work ceases to be primary and becomes secondary (Fisher 1952). The fuzziness of 
demarcation lines was reflected by frequently changing official definitions in New Zealand (1890-1921), cf. table.  
 
Year Definition of primary production 
General 
speak 
Agricultural and pastoral production 
1891 Agricultural, pastoral, mineral and other primary producers 
1896 All persons mainly engaged in cultivation or acquisition of food products, and in obtaining other 
raw materials from natural sources – and including persons engaged in forestry, water conservation 
and supply, mines and quarries. 
1901 Back to more narrow definition of 1891 
1921 –
broader 
again 
Agricultural and pastoral farming, market gardening, poultry and bee farming, fruit growing, fishing 
and trapping, mining and quarrying, bush saw-milling, scrub cutting and gum-digging. 
Table 3-2: Definition of primary production. 
 
Fisher (1939) indicated that the changing definitions was partly a result of farmers/producers vanity – that they 
exercised political influence in order to be classified as belonging to primary production, because this meant being 
most important - being primary, while secondary had a negative connotation. These ambiguities cast doubt on the 
tripartite classification, and the usefulness of analyses based upon it. Moreover, a critical comment that is valid for 
both the tripartite classification and generally industry classifications, is that they lack qualitative indicators that would 
be able transmit product and production process heterogeneity. 
 
Text Box 4: The tripartite classification. 
 
This picture of history indicates that economic development implies moving out of and away from 
natural resources. Still, there is not a complete consensus on what lies behind these patterns of 
structural change and what, if any, the role of natural resource-based industries have been in the 
process. Cohen and Zysman (1987) argue that the dominance of the outlined model of structural 
change and development is problematic because even though it is only a hypothesis it helps 
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coordinate the way economists think. It satisfies “a popular understanding of how an economy 
works and ought to work: it is simply clear as a bell that a country that does brain surgery and 
computer programming is, in a fundamental way, ahead of a country that does not and can not. But 
it is a slippery path from that hard truth to a model of development—and worse, a policy for 
development—based on those categories which now become analytical categories though they 
embody no real theory, though they do not square with the realities of economic organisation and 
linkages, and which, like the Brand X candies in the M&M’s ads, melt in your hand when you try to 
use them” (Cohen and Zysman 1987: p. 9).  
 
With a specific focus on natural resources there are at least two relevant opinions on the matter: (1) 
some argue that exploitation of natural resources stimulated the emergence of several other types of 
production such as services and manufacture. It is even argued that natural resources are an 
(comparative) advantage; (2) Others are more sceptical about the potential of natural resource-based 
activities, and argue that they are subject to a pathological disorder (Gunton 2003). I will present the 
two traditions in the following sections.     
4. Natural resources as advantage 
Intuitively natural resources should have a positive effect on economic development – it is an 
advantage – a gift that other nations do not have. Holding an abundance of natural resources would 
be an advantage in the sense that this abundant natural richness can easily be traded with other types 
of products desired. The theory can be placed in the theory group (1) where it does not matter what 
you produce or how you do it; except that you need perfect competition for factor price 
equalisation. The latter position is not so helpful in understanding the processes of structural change 
outlined above, though. Still, it has inspired more explicit thinking about the role of natural 
resources in economic growth and development – one example is the staple theory of economic 
growth.   
 
The staple theory tradition is a Canadian innovation. It was founded by Harold Innis in his studies 
of fishery and fur trade (Innis 1930; Innis 1940). According to Gunton (2003) the staple theory is a 
theory of export-led growth based on staple products that in turn are defined as being based on 
natural resource extraction and requiring little processing prior to export to industrial countries 
where they are used in the production of manufactured products. A staple industry is thus 
approximately identical to a natural resource-based industry. This definition is obviously motivated 
by specific historical circumstances – those of Canada initially after colonisation. Therefore 
Watkins (1963) argues that the theory is only valid for certain contexts such as that of a ‘new’ 
country where there is abundance of ‘empty’ land which yields favourable man-land ratios, and 
where there is absence of ‘inhibiting’ traditions. In this situation the production and export of the 
staple is the leading sector in the economy and set the pace for economic growth. Export is 
emphasized because at first there will be very limited domestic demand. Thus, given ‘factor 
proportions’ the new country has a comparative advantage in natural resource-based export 
industries. The natural-resource abundance imply that demand, capital, and entrepreneurship are 
available internationally due to interest for the staple product, instead of being restrained by 
regional consumption and savings rates (Gunton 2003). In this situation economic development will 
take the form of a process of diversification around the export base. Staple-led growth can thus be 
seen as a sequence of spread effects around the export sector. 
 
Related to the staple theory, Rollins (1971) more explicitly refers to less developed countries, and 
argues that they can also benefit from natural resource-based industries via spread-effects. During 
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the 1960s developed countries faced severe natural-resource scarcity which created interest in the 
natural resources of less developed countries. On the other hand less developed countries needed 
foreign capital investments to undertake economic development and thereby utilize their rich 
natural resources. In this sense an ‘imbalance’ of labour surplus and capital scarcity could be 
‘balanced’. Hence, natural-resource rich less developed countries should be better situated for 
earning foreign income via export to use for investments in e.g. manufacturing (Ross 1999). In the 
case of foreign investment in a less developed country, such a project could create employment 
which, through wages, would increase demand in local markets and thus stimulate economic 
activity. It could also lead to productivity increases on the supply-side in the natural resource-based 
industry, and facilitate spillover of knowledge to workers which they can apply elsewhere in the 
economy (Rollins 1971).  
 
Still, according to both Watkins (1963) and Rollins (1971) there are some conditions that must be 
met for the spread-effects to unfold. They are influenced by the nature of the ‘production function’ 
of the staple which “defines the degree of factor substitutability and the nature of returns to scale” 
(Watkins 1963: p. 144). In other words, if production can be mechanised then there will be demand 
for capital goods (technology) which will create the spread effects by the establishment of new, 
related industries. Given demand for the staple output, there are other context-specific conditions 
that influence whether these spread-effects materialize – these can be conceptualized as linkages. 
Watkins (1963; 1977) – inspired by Hirschman (1958) – distinguishes between (1) backward, (2) 
forward, (3) demand and (4) fiscal linkages, cf. Text Box 5. (1) Spread-effects and diversification of 
the economy will be largest if it is possible to produce capital inputs to staple production 
domestically. It is often seen that staple producers import technology which inhibits spread-effects. 
Watkins indicates that the transport system needed to collect and transport the staple is one of the 
most important backward linkages in general. (2) Staples differ in terms of further processing 
potential and this must be assessed according to a given context. (3) The income earned by workers 
should add to domestic demand to stimulate further spread effects. (4) The income generated from 
the staple in the form of tax on income and export should be reinvested in the country and 
contribute to domestic demand instead of potentially accumulate abroad. The state may use the 
extra revenue to stimulate economic activity by increasing public expenditure by e.g. increasing 
credit and credit availability and thereby stimulate private investments or simply increase public 
investments (Rollins 1971). 
 
Linkages 
 
Linkages are in economics general understood as couplings or relations between actors. Most often linkages are seen 
as channels of transactions for goods. Linkages are important because they are thought to be the basis for inter-sectoral 
dynamics which in turn stimulates structural change and development. Without linkages a sector can in principle never 
generate structural change – it may finance it, but it cannot ‘create’ it. Here I will distinguish between (a) vertical 
linkages (Ciccone 2008), but also (b) demand linkages and (c) fiscal linkages are important (Watkins 1963; Watkins 
1977; Hirschman 1981). I will mainly focus on vertical linkages.  
 
(a) Vertical linkages mainly focus on inter-industrial demand with a distinction between backward (upstream) and 
forward (downstream) linkages – these can be understood as production linkages. There are two points to be made in 
this respect: (i) Multiplier demand effects, and (ii) linkages investment effects. (i) With vertical linkages one industry 
can create growth in other industries via its demand for intermediate goods as inputs to production. (ii) Vertical 
linkages are also related to investment decisions. An investment decision in industry A (technological upgrading) will 
not necessarily lead to higher profits, unless industry B also makes investments or else the demand for industry A’s 
output will not rise. Industry A is dependent on industry B in order to fulfil the potential of its investment. Thus, the 
above reflects that investment decisions (and economic performance) are complementary and interdependent, and that 
economic structure influences investment incentives (Richardson 1990). This is what Hirschman (1958) analysed as 
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‘dynamic incentive structures’.  
 
(b) Demand linkages refer to the characteristics of demand regarding a specific production entity (in this case an 
industry or sector). It has two aspects: (i) how do employees in the industry spend their income? (ii) What is the nature 
of the demand for the industry’s output? An often-seen characteristic of staples is that production is severely dependent 
on international demand which establishes a dependency relation to the international economy that can generate 
uncertainty and instability. 
 
(c) Fiscal linkage refers to how the income generated by an industry, e.g. via export, is distributed and used – is it for 
example reinvested in the industry or country? The fiscal linkages can be weak e.g. in a situation where staple 
producers are foreign firms, or if domestic producers have taken up large loans internationally to finance investment in 
equipment. 
 
Text Box 5: Linkages. 
 
With respect to the possibility of domestically producing capital inputs and technology Watkins 
(1963) argues that a successful staple – one that manages to build strong linkages – will start by 
importing technology but gradually start to become self-sufficient via experimentation and 
innovation. In the successful case, the economy will eventually grow and diversify to the point 
where it can no longer be characterized as a staple economy. The latter implies a ‘well-developed’ 
manufacturing sector that serves the domestic and possibly foreign markets. The trade composition 
will change such that revenue from staple export and expenditure on manufacture imports will 
decrease as a share of GDP. On the other hand, if spread-effects do not materialize, the economy 
will end up in the ‘staple trap’. The staple trap refers to a situation where an economy is completely 
dependent on export of a staple product, which according to Watkins (1963), is not a viable long-
term strategy for economic growth and development. The reason is that staples are vulnerable on 
the demand side due to competition from synthetic substitutes, from cheaper suppliers, and due to 
low income elasticity of foreign demand or because of changing tastes. On the supply side staples – 
and natural resource-based industries in general – are subject to the law of decreasing returns to 
scale in the long run regardless of technological improvements. Watkins (1963) clearly believes that 
the staple trap is avoidable through policy measures while others argue that it is not – that it is an 
inherent quality of natural resources; that they are cursed. In either case the staple theory clearly has 
linkages as a central issue – in the words of Hirschman (1981) it is part of the linkage approach to 
economic development. Gunton (2003) consequently distinguishes between a ‘good’ staple that has 
‘strong’ linkages and a ‘bad’ staple which has ‘weak’ linkages.  
5. The paradox of plenty 
The resource-curse literature is a branch of literature in economics that argues that natural-resource 
abundance tends to be associated with meagre economic performance on the country level. While 
the staple theory sees a positive potential – and thus an active role in structural change – for natural 
resources, the resource curse insists that natural resources in general can not generate development.   
 
Reinert (2007) is a proponent of this more sceptical view on natural resources. He accepts that 
linkage dynamics is a basic mechanism in economic development – as proposed in the staple theory 
– but he argues that primary products in general, and agriculture in particular, is not part of this 
process. The starting point for his analysis is that economic growth is industry-specific; that some 
industries are better than others. He identifies manufacturing industries as ‘good’ types of 
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production and agricultural industries as ‘bad’ types of production6
 
. Reinert bases this dichotomy 
on the historical observations listed in the table below (2007: p. 261-62).  
‘Good’ (manufacture) ‘Bad’ (agriculture) 
Increasing returns to scale  Decreasing returns to scale  
Dynamics imperfect competition Perfect competition 
Large diversity and high division of labour  A minimum of diversity and low division of labour  
Stable prices Extreme price fluctuations 
Generally skilled labour Generally unskilled labour 
Create middle class Creates feudalist class structure 
‘sticky’ wages  Reversible wages 
Technical change increases price for producer Technical change lowers price to consumer 
Create large synergies (linkages, clusters) Create few synergies (no linkages) 
Table 5-1: Good and bad types of production. 
 
The different properties of the two types of production especially have consequences for 
development when they are related to international trade. Looking at a simplified world where less 
developed countries are specialized in primary production (decreasing returns to scale) and 
developed countries in secondary and tertiary production (increasing returns to scale) gives you a 
theory that clearly explains why poor countries should industrialize. Thus, according to Reinert 
(2007), less developed countries can escape poverty only by changing the productive structure away 
from the primary sector. Given these propositions “specialisation in agriculture, is specialisation in 
poverty” (Reinert 2007: p. 154). This simple dichotomy is not new; it was, according to Anderson 
(1998), also put forward by inter alia Marshall (1890). Moreover, the link to trade theory has also 
been promoted by inter alia Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950) and more recently by Krugman (1979). 
 
The dichotomy described is closely related to more recent research on natural resources and 
economic development because the arguments used against the possibility of natural resource-based 
development are virtually identical. The propositions made by Reinert (2007) nearly all fall within 
the category of the resource-curse literature. According to Gunton (2003) the term ‘resource curse’ 
was first used by Richard Auty (see e.g. Auty 2001) in the early 1990s when he, on the basis of 
several large research projects, concluded that natural resources seemed to be a curse rather than a 
blessing – also called ‘the paradox of plenty’. Moreover, several other researchers have found 
results that support Auty’s findings (see e.g. Sachs and Warner 1995; Gylfason 2001; Sachs and 
Warner 2001). Sachs and Warner (1995) for example finds a negative relation between annual 
growth rate of GDP in the period 1971-1989, and the share of primary-product export of GDP in 
1970, in a sample of 97 less developed countries. The latter results stands out as a point of reference 
ofr the resource-curse literature, but one should be observant to the general method of measurement, 
though, as it can easily lead to misunderstandings, see Text Box 6.  
  
Ross (1999) presents the main arguments for causality between the correlations observed by the 
latter scholars. I will review his and Reinert’s (2007) arguments below which includes: (i) 
deteriorating terms of trade; (ii) lack of investment due to dependence on instable commodity 
markets7
                                                 
6 Reinert (2007) does not clearly distinguish between agriculture and other forms of natural resource-based industry, but he 
uses the term ‘primary sector’ interchangeably with ‘agricultural sector’. I will, despite risk of imprecision, take latter terms to 
be equivalent to my definition of natural resource-based industries. Additionally, the content of that definition is also 
approximately covered by the term staple industry. These terms will be used interchangeably.    
; (iii) absence of linkages; and (iv) the Dutch disease.  
7 A commodity is a standardized good, which is often traded in large volumes and whose units are interchangeable. They are 
normally outputs from the primary sector such agriculture, mining and semi-processed products. 
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Aspects of measurement  
 
Regarding measurement I find it relevant to comment on: (i) definition of ‘natural-resource abundance’; (ii) fallacy of 
aggregation; (iii) and the periods of time under consideration.  
 
(i) ‘natural-resource abundance’ can inter alia be defined as natural resource-based industry in share of GDP, share of 
value-added, share of employment, share of export earnings or share export value-added at one point in time or over a 
period of time. These are the most often-used measurement indicators. Still, the indicators do not say anything about 
physical ‘natural-resource abundance’. They reflect a given country’s industrial structure and/or export composition – 
it illustrates the absence of the secondary and tertiary sectors, which is a ‘negative’ definition of natural resources. This 
set-up of data indicates the implicit understanding that the relative absence of manufacturing industries is a result of a 
rich nature. However, there is not necessarily a strong relation between industrial structure and physical endowment. 
There can be many reasons why a given industrial structure has or has not emerged. A country does not need to have a 
relatively spectacular richness in natural resources to have an industrial/trade structure characterized by natural 
resource-based industry (Denmark is historically an example of this). Nor is natural richness a guarantee that a country 
will specialize in natural resource-based industry (USA). Hence, ‘natural-resource abundance’ in the following is to be 
understood as an industrial structure dominated by natural resource-based industry – not as a relatively large physical 
endowment of natural resources. I will use the term ‘natural-resource rich/poor’ about physical endowments. Still, it is 
unclear when a country is rich in natural resources. Such an evaluation would be dependent on a resource-population 
ratio on what exactly constitutes a natural resource in a given context.  
 
(ii) There is a general fallacy of aggregation in the resource-curse literature. It has been shown that processes of 
learning and capability building differs across firms, industries, place and time (Dosi 1988). It is highly likely that 
important differences exist between natural resource-based industries as for example mining, agriculture and fishery, 
and also within these categories there are differences in terms of crops, climate, topography, species and extraction – 
differences that require specific knowledge. This is also noted by Bridge (2008) who points out that it is remarkable 
that in the discussion of natural resources and development the nuances of specific and contextual arguments have 
gone missing. This is inter alia seen by an almost exclusive focus on the national level which again ignores other types 
of foci such as sector differences, organisation of firms or capability building.  
 
(iii) It is relevant to pay attention to the periods of time of measurement due to: (a) considerations about the pace of 
structural change and what can be expected in short vis-à-vis longer time spans. Statistical evidence for resource curse 
is often based on only a few decades of observation, but structural change may take longer, and will most likely not be 
visible in aggregate statistics (Wright and Czelusta 2002); (b) importance of ‘external’ events that might influence the 
observed phenomenon.  
 
Text Box 6: Aspects of measurement. 
Deteriorating terms of trade 
The terms of trade is a central element in the Latin American structuralist school8 (Palma 2008b). It 
was noted by both Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) that the terms of trade of less developed 
countries was deteriorating vis-à-vis the developed countries. They saw this as a main obstacle to 
economic development in Latin America. Classical economists, following Ricardo, claimed that 
terms of trade for primary products would improve over time due to the inelastic supply of them9
                                                 
8 Terms of trade refers to the ratio of an index of a country’s export prices to an index of its import prices. The terms of 
trade are said to improve if this ratio increases, so that each unit of export pays for more import and vice versa. Focus is 
only unit value of traded goods and not volume. In terms of the theory of comparative advantage this implies that the index 
for terms of trade reflects the relative purchasing power or exchange relation between two actors. In a framework with two 
goods and one factor of production, labour, then the ratio reflects the exchange relation of labour hours. 
, 
which is a positive side of seeing natural resources as subject to decreasing returns to scale. 
Prebisch was one of the first to alter this perception, by claiming that the terms of trade were 
9 The sincerity or stronghold of this perception was reflected by that W. S. Jevons kept an enormous stock of coal in the 
basement of this house (Findlay 2008).    
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deteriorating for primary products (Hadass and Williamson 2001). The premise for the argument is 
– in accordance with Reinert’s (2007) trade hypothesis – that in the primary sector prices will not 
increase as much as in the secondary sector because of (i) labour market asymmetries and/or (ii) 
differences in innovation, (iii) in competition, (iv) and in structure of demand. 
 
(i)  The argument comes in two versions. (a) In developed countries unions are strong, so in 
economic upturns prices rise and real wages rise, and they become sticky due the power of unions 
in economic downturns. In less developed countries unions are weak. Therefore wages (and thus 
prices) will not rise as much here in upturns, but will fall more in downturns (they are not sticky). 
(b) Labour markets in less developed countries are characterized by an unlimited pool of labour. 
This implies that wages (and hence prices) will not grow and remain at the ‘subsistence wage’. This 
is not the case in developed countries where workers will demand higher wages that will push up 
prices (Hadass and Williamson 2001). 
  
(ii) The ‘fact’ that productivity growth, positive externalities and innovation are stronger in the 
secondary sector (Palma 2008b), implies that primary producers’ exchange relation worsens over 
time. Also, innovation often results in more efficient use of raw material, and thus less demand for 
primary products, which leads to a relatively poorer exchange situation for primary producers.  
 
(iii) Markets for primary products are characterized by ‘perfect’ competition because the product is 
assumed to be easy to imitate, and thus substitute. The latter keeps prices low and implies that 
competition mostly takes place on the basis of low wages. In the secondary sector there is 
‘imperfect’ competition because it is assumed that products are not easy to imitate, so prices can 
easier increase. Here competition takes place on the basis of innovation. Moreover, even if 
innovation takes place in a less developed country it will often not stimulate economic 
development. Due to the labour market institutions technical progress will lower prices for 
consumers due to price competition while technical progress in developed countries result in higher 
prices. This further worsens the exchange relation for primary producers. 
 
(iv) It is well documented that the share of a house hold’s income allocated to food purchases 
decreases as income rises – this known as Engel’s Law (Browning 2008). Consequently, the 
(international) demand for food products will not rise significantly as income levels increase. This 
will limit market growth and hinder price increases. According to Scitovsky (1976) Engel’s Law is 
not thought to be valid for manufacture and especially service products where innovation and 
novelty continuously attracts consumers, which ensures a high income elasticity. The structure of 
demand – or nature of demand linkages – thus also negatively affects terms of trade for food 
products. Still, it is not obvious that one can aggregate from food products to commodities, energy 
and raw materials.     
  
The empirical results for the ‘Prebisch-Singer hypothesis’ have been mixed but currently there is a 
consensus on that price volatility has been more significant than a downward price trend, which 
implies that the conclusion one can reach depends on what time period one is looking at (Findlay 
2008; Baffes and Haniotis 2010). On the level of the product groups you get another picture 
because terms-of-trade trends vary both across time periods, and across and within primary-product 
groups as food, metals and textiles (Kjeldsen-Kragh 2007). Looking at price movements between 
1900 and 1983, only five commodities had significant negative trends; five others had positive 
trends and sixteen were trendless. Among the five with negative trends, three were wheat, maize 
and hides (Ross 1999). Another finding that questions the power of the terms-of-trade argument is 
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that during the last 15 years it has been the terms of trade for manufacturing that has been declining 
(Ferranti, Perry et al. 2002).   
 
The ambiguous empirical results most likely reflect that arguments for Reinert’s dichotomy are too 
general and imprecise to describe experiences with natural resources in general. Also, none of the 
mentioned characteristics of natural resources are given by law. They are rather heavily influenced 
by contextual factors as in the case of labour market institutions and regulation of competition. 
Also, even though innovation activities may be stronger in manufacturing it seems peculiar to 
completely ignore such activities in natural resource-based.   
Instability in natural-resource income 
The argument is that markets for primary products are more instable than other markets, which can 
make a country more vulnerable and instable. According to Ross (1999) there is a consensus among 
researchers, that markets for primary products are exceptionally unstable. This leaves two aspects to 
consider – (i) wherefrom the volatility arises, and (ii) what the consequences of volatility are.   
 
(i) Sources of price volatility in markets for natural resources are often grouped into three sources: 
(a) demand side changes; (b) supply side changes; or (c) speculation in the futures market. (a) 
Heavy export specialisation in natural resources implies dependency on international demand which 
can fluctuate for various reasons. Still, any export good is dependent on foreign demand, but the 
main problem here seems to be lack of economic diversification and not necessarily natural 
resources per se10. (b) natural resource-based industry often depends on ecological conditions. The 
vulnerability to relatively unpredictable changes in climatic, natural or disease conditions as e.g. 
drought, flood, animal virus or temperature swings have added much volatility to the industries 
affected. (c) Whether speculation destabilizes or stabilizes the futures market is not straightforward 
to determine11
(ii) Ross (1999) reports that there is not agreement on whether instability in markets for primary 
products is a problem for economic performance. In favour of a positive relation between instability 
and growth, it is argued that price booms induce unusually high levels of investments inter alia 
because exporters try to protect themselves against future shocks. This can stimulate capital 
accumulation and economic growth. On the other hand according to Singer (1950) such ‘booms’ 
tend to diminish incentives to diversify the economic structure because ‘things’ are going well, and 
but incentives increase in natural-resource ‘busts’ when the penalty for lacking economic 
diversification is felt hardest. This is what he refers to as institutional short-sightedness. Also in 
favour of a negative relation, it is argued that instability makes private investment more risky and 
. On one side a volatile market creates a demand for speculators who are willing to 
bear the risk. On the other hand the expectations of speculators, and subsequent actions, may affect 
price movements. Also, the presence of speculators might lure producers into more risky investment 
projects that, despite potential volatility, might improve overall ‘welfare’ (Newbery 2008). In 
general it is a controversial matter whether speculation tends to bring stability or volatility to a 
market (Black 2003).  
                                                 
10 In this case diversification can be in (a) number of goods exported, and (b) number of buyers. 
11 A future is a special type of ’forward contract’ wherein two agents agree on a transaction for delivery at a specified future 
date. In the futures market contacts are characterised by being standardized which minimizes transaction cost and facilitates 
high liquidity such that contracts can be bought and sold several times during their lifetime. The standard explanation for a 
futures market is that it helps to spread, and thus reduce, risk for both buyer and producer. Speculation is mainly carried out 
for certain products as commodities and financial assets because they are exceptionally standardized and liquid, and can 
therefore be traded rapidly as response to any changes in expectations. 
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thus hinders it, which in turn slows growth12
Natural Resources and Linkages 
. The empirical results on the link between volatility 
and economic performance are inconclusive (Ross 1999). Still, it is true that most natural resource-
based industries are more dependent on ecological conditions than manufacturing activities, but 
these can often be mitigated and managed via competence building. Also, given that price volatility 
is severe in primary products there is room for policy measures. Lack of diversification and poor 
management through bust and boom periods can hardly be ascribed solely to natural resources; 
instead it is an institutional and policy challenge.   
It is in economics generally thought that industries in the primary sector have fewer, or no, linkages 
to other industries compared to industries in the secondary and tertiary sectors. For example 
Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007: p. 4) recently argued that: “…unlike other sources of wealth, 
natural resource wealth does not need to be produced. It simply needs to be extracted. Since it is 
not a result of a production process, the generation of natural resource wealth can occur quite 
independently of other economic processes that take place in a country; it is in a number of ways, 
enclaved… without major linkages to other industrial sectors”. This is in stark contrast with the 
positive version of the staple theory. The quote reflects a position that acknowledge the importance 
of linkage dynamics (often termed externalities or spill-overs), but does not believe that natural 
resource-based industries are relevant in that respect, cf. theory group (3). I will in this section 
elaborate on why this is so. There are, at least, two arguments for why linkages can be weak, few or 
absent in primary production: (i) one argument is that foreign ownership hinders linkages; the 
enclave argument; (ii) another argument is that – as formulated by Gunton (2003) – natural 
resources are subject to a pathological disorder that hinders linkage building.  
The enclave argument 
Absence of linkages in natural resource-based industry was not broadly problematised before World 
War 2. At this time most less developed countries were highly specialized in producing natural 
resources as a consequence of the colonial economy, where these areas had been used as suppliers 
of raw material. In Latin America and Africa the natural resource-based industries were often the 
property of colonisers or local elites who were oriented both culturally and economically towards 
the colonial powers. The popular book ‘Open veins of Latin America’, which describes the 
‘economic bloodletting’ of the continent, was a result of such experiences (Galeano 1971).  
 
On the basis of mineral economies in Latin America in the 1960s Rollins (1971) argues that the 
linkage-dynamics can not take place in natural resources in less developed countries; instead a 
staple trap will prevail. With this historical context as point of departure Rollins considers: (i) 
creation of employment (demand linkage); (ii) productivity increases; (iii) spillover of knowledge; 
(iv) backward linkages and (v) fiscal linkages. (i) Creation of employment for locals could be 
limited since natural resource-based industry is often very capital intensive. Also, the jobs will most 
likely be for unskilled labour with low wages. (ii) Productivity increases are naturally expected, but 
these will most likely not benefit the local economy, cf. terms of trade. (iii) Knowledge spillovers to 
the national economy via workers is likewise unlikely because local/national employees perform 
unskilled work. (iv) Backward linkages will not exist because machinery purchase and service is 
                                                 
12 Another source of volatility is possible accumulation of debt. In natural resource booms the credit ratings of less 
developed countries improve, and they tend to lend money that may indebt them when the boom goes bust and prices, and 
income, fall again. It might be a good idea if loans are invested wisely in infrastructure etc. Still, it is a big ‘if’ because the 
nature of natural-resource abundance makes natural-resource rich countries subject to corruption, theft and incompetence, 
according to Humphreys, Sachs et al. (2007). 
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likely to be imported from abroad because the host country does not have an advanced secondary 
sector. (v) Fiscal linkages are likely to be weak because in competition for foreign investment 
project less developed countries have often used low taxes to attract foreign investment, and thus 
tried to trade the fiscal linkage for demand linkages, that rarely exist. This implies that profits 
accumulate in the source country, and thus will not benefit the host country. In general host 
countries have been surprisingly poor at putting up demands for property rights, taxation, 
knowledge transfer, environmental regulation and work conditions.  
 
Thus, according to Rollins (1971) foreign investment projects are likely to be harmful for the 
economic development of the host country. The apparent inescapable causality of the latter is based 
on that the host country lacks capital and that natural resource-based industry is capital-intensive, so 
therefore the industry is often build by large multinational enterprises that have a bias for 
establishing backward and forward linkages to their home economies rather than to the local one 
(Gunton 2003). Even though Rollins’s (1971) analysis is based on few specific cases, the points 
have been confirmed by other studies (Auty 2001; Humphreys, Sachs et al. 2007). Still, in its 
essence, the arguments have more to do with what we can call institutions and economic 
management – ‘weak’ linkages – than it has to do with natural resource-based industry per se. It is 
not an argument against investing in natural resource-based industry, but it is a lesson on how such 
investment should be carried out.   
The Nature of natural resources  
Even though the work of Hirschman (1958) on linkages is closely related with the staple theory, he 
excluded primary production from the important linkage dynamics. Hirschman (1958: p. 109-110) 
argued: “the lack of interdependencies and linkages is of course one of the most typical 
characteristics of underdeveloped economies…agriculture in general and subsistence agriculture in 
particular, are of course characterized by the scarcity of linkages effects. By definition, all primary 
production should exclude any substantial degree of backward linkage13…the case for inferiority of 
agriculture to manufacturing has most frequently been argued on grounds of comparative 
productivity. While this case has been shown not to be entirely convincing, agriculture certainly 
stands convicted on the count of its lack of direct stimulus to setting up new activities through 
linkage effects: the superiority of manufacture in this respect is crushing
 
. This may yet be the most 
important reason militating against any complete specialisation of underdeveloped countries in 
primary production”.  
Thus, the argument is that backward linkages are thought to be few because natural resource-based 
industry does not demand inputs. The input needed is nature, and nature is just there to be taken. It 
is assumed that the natural resources are directly available in nature. Also, backward linkages to 
science and capital goods are thought to be weak, because natural resource-based industry is 
assumed to be straightforward to manage. In the primary sector there is not application of 
sophisticated knowledge and no innovation. However, as also pointed out by Hirschman above, this 
is only true for the simplest perception possible of agriculture, as for example picking an apple from 
a tree. Still, today apple production is extensively mechanised and has linkages to science. Relevant 
knowledge bases are inter alia agronomy, precision agriculture, vaccines, and biotechnology. Also, 
                                                 
13 Hirschman does acknowledge that “the introduction of modern methods does bring with considerable outside purchases 
of seeds, fertilizers and, and other current inputs, not to speak of machines and vehicles. We may say that the more 
primitive the agricultural and mining activities, the more truly primary they are” (Hirschman 1958: p. 109-110). This does 
not change his main point, though.     
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as pointed out by Watkins (1963), backward linkages to infrastructure and especially transport are 
often very important.  
 
Forward linkages are thought to be few because end products go directly to the consumer or are 
used as input to other industries in the form of raw materials. Raw materials per definition do not 
need processing – they are grown right out of the earth’s crust wherefrom they are easily collected. 
If they were processed they would not be primary products. But these are simplifying assumptions 
rather than facts. Still, as pointed out by Fischer (1952) it is not easy to determine the precise stage 
in the conversion of milk into butter or cheese when this work ceases to be primary and becomes 
secondary. The products produced by natural resource-based industries, as defined in this work, are 
most often processed even though it may not be to the same degree as secondary products. Besides, 
demand for natural resources has risen over the past decades to volumes that were earlier 
unimaginable in the form of food, raw materials and energy due to growth in global GDP and 
population. 
 
Despite the obvious objections listed above, the understanding of primary production as exposed by 
Hirschman (1958) (mainly based on subsistence agriculture or enclave industries) is currently part 
of the resource curse thesis as illustrated by inter alia Reinert (2007), Gylfason (2004) and 
Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007). Combined these studies have contributed to transforming 
context-specific experiences into a general conceptual model for understanding natural resources  
which is in accordance with the tripartite model of structural change. The latter stereotypic 
understanding ignores that the nature of economic activities tends to differ across time and place, 
and tends to underestimate or dismiss learning activities in natural resource-based industries.  
 
In this respect it is interesting to note that later Hirschman (1981) acknowledged that the lack of 
linkages in natural resource-based industry as compared to manufacture was not a consequence of 
natural resources per se. It was rather because the actors involved in these industries often were not 
capable of establishing new activities related to e.g. agriculture, and thus creating new linkages, that 
were significantly distant from the ongoing activities in terms of knowledge and technology. Thus, 
according to Hirschman (1981) the real barrier to development was inability to build capabilities 
and ‘strong’ linkages around the resource base. His change of mind has not influenced the general 
understanding of natural resources, though.  
The Dutch Disease  
The Dutch Disease is really neither a disease nor Dutch. It is, according to Gylfason (2008), rather a 
recurring phenomenon that involves a reallocation of resources – for example from high-tech, skill-
intensive service and manufacturing industries to low-tech, low-skill primary production – with 
lasting harmful effects on economic growth and diversification. The name remains in use because 
the Netherlands was the first patient to be diagnosed. The Dutch-disease model describes a situation 
where an economy suddenly receives windfall earnings from an unexpected discovery of natural 
resources – it is named after the Dutch discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in the 1960s. A gas 
export boom led to an appreciation of the Dutch Guilder, and subsequently total exports from the 
Netherlands decreased. The causality of the argument goes as this: (i) an export boom (of natural 
resources) leads to appreciation of the exchange rate which gives worse terms for manufacture to 
export; (ii) the export boom will draw capital and labour from manufacturing sectors. This 
reallocation of resources will increase cost of labour and materials (because initially the economy 
was in equilibrium) and thus increase cost for all sectors, which will increase the general price 
level; (iii) because of the latter, and currency appreciation, export of manufacture decreases and the 
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price of non-tradeables rises; (iv) foreign income from natural-resource export will in turn be used 
to import now cheaper foreign manufactured goods (spending effect). So, as the natural resource-
based industry grows it attracts key labour inputs from the rest of the economy, which benefits 
natural resource-based industry and non-tradeables sector.  
 
Since the starting point is that natural resource based industry can not lead growth and development 
(decreasing returns to scale), the process will inhibit long-term economic development in the 
country by negatively affecting the manufacturing sectors. In general the Dutch Disease has given 
precedence to a range of so-called crowding-out explanations for the resource curse. Scholars state 
that some factor x is positive for economic growth, and that ‘natural-resource abundance’ in some 
way crowds out x. Such arguments have been put forward regarding foreign direct investment, 
social capital, human capital, saving, investment, financial depth and inflation (Gylfason 2004). 
Several objections can be made to the argumentation but the most important is that even if we 
accept that natural resource-based industry is inferior to manufacture, then there are several degrees 
of freedom for the government to take counteracting measures. The Dutch Disease is basically 
describing bad policy management. This part of the argument is strongly related to issues of 
institutions rather than to a problem with natural resource-based industry per se. In general it can be 
argued that the scholars operating within this part of the resource-curse literature are confusing 
demand effects and supply effects. Demand swings that can lead to windfall earnings and tempt 
governments into unsound policy are different from the processes of industrial dynamics that are 
behind long-run supply and technological learning (Wright and Czelusta 2002). 
 
The foundation of the argument is the negative perception of natural resources which is here 
apparently unrelated to the issue of linkages. Instead, an acceptance of Malthus’ argument 
(decreasing returns to scale) and the vast number of historical examples of staple traps have played 
an important role in establishing a consensus in economics, which states that in these activities there 
is very limited innovation and productivity growth, and therefore they can not lead development. 
The point is reflected in the method of argumentation used by Matsuyama (1992) on the role of 
agricultural productivity, where he at the outset assumes learning by doing in manufacturing and no 
learning in agriculture. One could argue that when operating with such assumptions, conclusions 
are given a priori.  
 
On the one hand this negative perception is related to the idealising of manufacturing industries as 
growth poles. To explain the negative aspects of de-industrialisation, Palma (2008) states that 
“…manufacturing is an activity considered by many as the most effective engine of growth – either 
because it is a crucial driver of outward shifts of the production frontier, or due to its capacity to 
set in motion processes of cumulative causation based on increasing returns”. Therefore de-
industrialisation is thought to have long-term negative effects on growth, investment and 
employment. One could question this logic of arguing backwards – if manufacturing is good, then 
what is not manufacturing is bad – a crowding out of the ‘good’. On the other hand the Malthusian 
perception of natural resources as a fixed stock also feeds the negative perception. For example 
Gylfason (2008) argues that “natural resource wealth is a fixed factor of production that hampers 
economic growth because it causes a growing labour force and a growing stock of capital to go 
into diminishing returns”.  
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As an auxiliary explanation Gylfason (2001) finds that in ‘natural-resource abundant’ countries 
investment in education is relatively poor14. From this he inferes that employees in natural resource-
based industry tend to have a relatively low level of education. Seeing human capital as a source of 
growth Gylfason (2001: p. 856) further inferes that “natural resource-based industry as a rule
Text Box 7
 is 
less high-skill labour intensive than other industries, and thus confers relatively few external 
benefits on other industries…primary production and primary exports tend to impede learning by 
doing, technological advance and economic growth”. Even if one acknowledges the latter 
crowding-out explanation on the national level, it is still not obvious that learning and innovation do 
not take place at the industry level in primary production, as a rule. Moreover, the argument does 
not fit well with the fact that some countries have moved from being natural resource-based 
economies to being considered advanced, knowledge-based economies, as e.g. most Scandinavian 
countries and the US; see  and Text Box 8. Moreover, according to Smith (2007), it is a 
misunderstanding that all natural resource-based economies are poor. On the contrary, some of the 
richest, and/or fastest growing, economies today are resource based. These economies include 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the Netherlands.  
 
A general objection to this perception that could be made is that the obvious omission in Malthus’ 
argument is the role played by technological progress, which has continuously increased 
agricultural productivity. Ferranti, Perry et al. (2002) show that productivity growth in agriculture 
has outpaced that of manufacturing in both developed and less developed countries during the 20th 
century. More precisely, they find that in the period 1967 to 1992 total factor productivity growth 
was significantly higher in agriculture than in manufacture; especially in developed countries. On 
this basis the authors conclude that “natural resource-based activities can have high productivity 
growth, technical spillovers, and forward and backward linkages as much as modern 
manufacturing…the view that manufacturing has something special must be called into question” 
(p. 4-7). The latter point indicates that the proponents of the negative perception of natural 
resources tend to confuse historical coincidences with universal laws.  
 
Natural resources in Norway 
 
Norway has historically been specialized in natural resource-based industries. In the 19th century Norway responded to 
demands from the leading economy of the time, England, by increasing export of salted/dried fish and timber. The 
increasing transport of natural resources from Norway to England stimulated the development of shipping and 
shipbuilding industries as a backward linkage – by the 1880s Norway had against all likelihood the world’s third 
largest shipping fleet. As a response to the growing natural resource-based industries several linkages to what we can 
call manufacturing appeared. Shipbuilding technology improved significantly, and production of intermediate products 
related to ship transport took off. Also, saw mills improved their equipment and implemented stream-driven saws in 
the 1870s. Norway actually started to export pulp and paper machinery in the 1890s. With respect to the fishing 
industry, whaling and canning took hold. In the 20th century new natural resource-based industries appeared. These 
were based on access to cheap energy. Due to development of capabilities in chemical and electronic engineering 
Norway had succeeded in exploiting its waterfalls for production of hydroelectricity, which attracted foreign 
investments in energy-intensive products as zinc, artificial fertilizers and aluminium (Cappelen and Mjøset 2009).  
 
During the developments in the 19th century foreign capital played an important role, and foreigners had a strong 
presence in many areas. After independence from Sweden in 1905 Norway nationalized many parts of economy that 
were dominated by foreigners. Politicians implemented ‘concession laws’ that gave Norwegian authorities control over 
the relevant water resources. Still, the law changes allowed for joint ventures between national and foreign enterprises, 
which according to Cappelen and Mjøset (2009) was aimed at developing a Norwegian knowledge base for the 
                                                 
14 In a sample of 52 natural-resource abundant countries he inter alia finds that gross secondary-school enrolment in the 
period 1980-1997 is significantly negatively correlated with stock of natural capital in 1994 (defined similarly to ‘natural-
resource abundance’).  
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relevant engineering supply industries. Subsequently, manufacturing of turbines and machinery for power production 
became significant backward linkages from hydropower. Also, after World War 2 production of components for 
automobile production developed as a forward linkage from the production of aluminium.  
 
After World War 2 another natural resource-based industry was added to Norway’s portfolio – oil and gas. At the time 
when Norway discovered oil and gas it did not posses the capabilities necessary to develop an oil industry, which 
stimulated a process of foreign capital inflow and suggested a dominant role of multinational enterprises. In the spirit 
of the earlier concession laws Norway created a national oil company, Statoil, in 1972 which was put in control of oil 
extraction and distribution. The state in Norway had from the start a strategy on knowledge acquisition from foreign 
firms, and actually one of Statoil’s main tasks was to organise learning and technology transfers. Also, universities 
started up activities as research and education in areas relevant for the oil industry. According to Cappelen and Mjøset 
(2009) policy was targeted at developing linkages between the oil industry and suppliers. For example Statoil would 
exercise public procurement by placing orders with several old and new Norwegian firms, which resulted in that old 
shipyards were restructured into producers of oil-related technology. Mainly due to the rough Norwegian waters a new 
design for oil platforms was developed. Norway developed several product innovations that would later be 
internationally competitive. Also special engineering, ICT and other business services have benefitted from the 
development of the oil industry in Norway. It is moreover remarkable to note that other countries as England, Denmark 
and the Netherlands also discovered oil and gas in the same period as Norway. While such discoveries were associated 
with harmful economic effects (to manufacturing) in the Netherlands, it actually strengthened manufacturing activities 
in Norway (Fagerberg, Mowery et al. 2009).     
 
The above reflects that the Norwegian state was actively building institutions and linkages to avoid a dependency and 
‘enclave’ situation with the international division of labour in mind – and also that it is possible to do so. The 
institution building facilitated processes of capability building in several complementary areas related to oil 
production. It is an example of how co-evolution between natural resource-based industry and manufacturing 
contributes to economic development, and where natural resource-based industry is actually ‘leading’ the process.  
 
Text Box 7: Natural resources in Norway. 
 
6. The nature of natural resources and institutions 
The review of the logical foundations of the resource curse has resulted in the following: (i) several 
aspects of the arguments can be ascribed to specific contexts and institutions, but not be aggregated 
to be valid universally; (ii) subtracting the latter there still remain a core understanding of natural 
resources as inferior to other types of economic activities. It is based on a perception of natural 
resources as being finite and exogenous. These points will be considered in reverse order below. 
Finiteness and exogeneity   
This issue takes us back to the dynamic perception of natural resources and distinction between 
nature and natural resources; see Table 2-1. When the ‘stock’ of natural resources at any given time 
is a result of accumulated knowledge, then it is problematic to understand this stock as fixed. Still, it 
is a rather counterintuitive thought that natural resources are infinite, and that is because they are 
not – they are and they are not at the same time. Obviously the issue of finiteness must be 
considered in relation to time. According to the laws of thermodynamics the (very) long run 
availability of energy and matter to humans is finite (Georgescu-Roegen 1975). This is an important 
perspective, but for understanding processes of economic development, we must focus on shorter 
time horizons. One could argue that in the short-run natural resources are finite, in the medium-run 
they are non-finite, and in the very long run they are also finite.  
 
The most economically important sources of energy and material, and the production process 
behind, have changed several times since global economic growth and development took off about 
250 years ago, and there are no indications of that this pattern of changing sources will disappear. 
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Rosenberg (1976) argues that successful processes of resource creation and extension have been the 
foundation of countries’ capability to follow the shifts in energy sources and materials that have 
characterized economic development. ‘Knowledge explosions’ have historically undermined the 
tendency to diminishing returns in natural resource-based industries. Production of rubber is one 
example of these processes. Rubber from the Amazons had been known to westerners for centuries 
but it was not until Charles Goodyear discovered ‘vulcanisation’ in 1839, that rubber became a 
resource (creation). It became a resource because his discovery made it possible to satisfy human 
wants with the use of rubber. Eventually rubber production from the Amazon region was overtaken 
by producers in South-East Asia (obsolescing/extension), and both were later overtaken by 
production of synthetic rubber (obsolescing/creation), which was developed during World War 2 
(Zimmermann 1972). Obviously, these processes are characterized by learning and capability 
building.  
 
Rosenberg (1976) suggests that learning in relation to natural resource-based activities inter alia 
take place according to the following parameters: (1) raising output per unit of resource input; (2) 
development of new materials – synthetic fibres, plastic; (3) productivity increase in extraction 
process; (4) productivity increase in process of exploration and resource discovery; (5) development 
of techniques to reuse waste and by-products; (6) development of techniques for the exploitation of 
lower-grade, or other more abundant, resources. Learning is, according to Smith (2007), often 
initiated due to competitive transformation pressures that call for improvements in mechanisation, 
automation, economies of scale, transport, and infrastructure that are increasingly ‘science-based’. 
 
Natural resources are not infinite but perceiving them as finite gives an unsatisfactory 
understanding of them because they can be, and are constantly, subject to processes of creation, 
extension and obsolescing – processes that necessarily are characterized by learning and knowledge 
accumulation. The arguments above seriously question that natural resources are fixed, finite, and 
thus, per definition, subject to decreasing returns to scale as assumed in e.g. Reinert’s (2007) 
dichotomy15
 
.  
Minerals and oil in the US  
 
According to Wright and Czelusta (1997; 2002; 2004) the US was 1913 the world leader in production of virtually 
every mineral. And this was not because of a proportional natural endowment of natural resources – instead it was a 
result of learning. Between 1900 and 1914 the US produced 10 times more copper than Chile even though Chile had, 
and has, a much larger geological endowment. The US mineral industries advanced in 1870s and 1880s due to huge 
capital investments, but the major breakthroughs took place in metallurgy and improved conversion processes as e.g. 
the Bessemer process which allowed for a far higher exploitation rate of the mineral. Moreover, according to Wright 
and Czelusta (2002) there is reason to believe that the US leadership in minerals was a significant factor in shaping, if 
not propelling, the US path to world leadership in manufacture. The US had significant ‘materials-using bias’ in 
technical change in 9 of 20 USA manufacturing industries between 1850 and 1919: “Nearly all USA manufactured 
goods were closely linked to the natural-resource economy in “one way or another”: petroleum products, primary 
copper, meat packing and poultry, steel works and rolling mills, coal mining, vegetable oils, grain mill products, 
sawmill products, and so on. These observations by no means diminish the country’s industrial achievement, but they 
confirm that American industrialisation was built upon natural resources” (p. 5). Among key explanatory factors for 
the US’s experience in minerals are; (a) liberal and softly enforced legal environment; (b) investments in infrastructure 
and public knowledge as geological surveys; (c) education and research in mining, minerals, geology and metallurgy in 
which the US was world leader at the time.  
                                                 
15 The distinction between renewable energy and non-renewable energy is not irrelevant here (stock and flow), but it is 
mitigated by the possibility to argue that renewable energy is also finite in a natural scientific way – again it is a matter of 
time perception. Still, given energy scarcity, prices and political priorities is it often preferable to be dependent on natural 
resources that are renewable in the short and medium run. 
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Oil is an extreme example of the mechanisms just described. The discovery of oil as a valuable natural resource was 
made in the US despite the country’s relatively poor natural endowment of oil. The first oil well was established in 
1859. Gradually the US built up the “American way of life” based on cheap oil and automobiles. By 1913 the US 
production of oil amounted to a bit more than 60% of world production despite the majority of known oil resources 
were located in the Middle East (Mousdale 2008). Often American geologists were employed as consultants by oil 
firms to help locate deposits of oil in the ground. The industry quickly saw the value of scientific knowledge which 
created linkages between academia and industry. Young geologists used the national US geological survey to apply the 
novel anti-clinical theory which successfully was used to locate oil deposits. The use of new theory resulted in better 
search methods. In general the oil industry invested in the accumulation of knowledge in geology to serve its activities 
which is reflected by the establishment of the Berkley and Stanford Universities that are children of the oil boom in 
California. Also, there emerged an important linkage to the chemical industry. Actually, with the development of 
petrochemicals in the 1920s, one may say that oil was instrumental in the transition of manufacturing in USA from 
traditional mass production to science-based technologies. Until the 1920s the base material in chemical industry had 
mostly been coal, but this changed radically in the following years. The shift from coal to oil as raw material brought 
the US to the world frontier in chemical industries. A drive for diversification created important forward linkages 
wherein new industries were created on the basis of new knowledge.  
 
The paragraph indicates that (i) it was not abundance of natural resources per se (in terms of deposits) that was the 
reason for American leadership, but learning and capability building; (ii) that the development of manufacturing 
industry in some way was related to the development of natural resource-based industries.  
 
Text Box 8: Minerals and oil in the US. 
 
To understand natural resources as exogenous to the economic system is equivalent to stating that 
they do not have linkage potential for development. It implies that growth of natural resource-based 
industries will not lead to diversification; but instead to a staple trap. As argued above natural 
resources have, in principle, linkages of all kinds. Natural resources must be produced, and are not 
freely available in nature, see Text Box 9. It requires development of technology and knowledge to 
build ships to go fishing, to extract minerals, to exploit wind energy and to improve agricultural 
yields. This argument strongly relates to the points of extending and creating natural resources, and 
illustrates the necessity of understanding natural resources as dynamic.  
 
Mineral discovery in Australia  
 
Compared to the US, countries as Chile, Russia, Canada and Australia started very late with their natural resource 
exploitation. Australia is a special case. It was a British colony and part of the British Empire in the same sense as the 
US in terms of institutions, but it was lacking behind most developed countries in income, education and technology. 
In USA people had the true entrepreneurship spirit to go out and create, take risks and look for fame and fortune. In 
Australia there was a largely pessimistic feeling about the size and value of natural resources which lasted up until the 
1950s. At one point Australian politicians even put export limits on minerals in order to save some for the future. Due 
to changes in policy and ‘attitude exploration and exploitation of minerals took off and led to many new discoveries 
after 1960. Canada has a similar story. In 1966 Canada was not seen as a country rich in natural resources (Wright and 
Czelusta 2002). This shows us that informal institutions and knowledge are important for perceiving value of nature. It 
also illustrates that natural resources should be partly understood as a dynamic, endogenous concept.  
 
During the 1990s the Australian mineral industry increased capital stock and production while the deposits of known 
resources have grown as a result of more and better exploration. These activities have according to Wright and 
Czelusta (2002: 26) stimulated other economic activities: “The surge in production of mineral inputs has carried a 
number of new and old industries along in its wake. In the decades following the onset of Australia's most recent 
minerals boom, leading manufacturing industries had obvious connections to minerals: metal and steel products, 
autos, industrial equipment, petroleum products, ships, and chemicals”. Also, Australian firms are world leaders in 
mining software systems, and in general mining firms export services and equipment. Also, based on experience in 
mining activities, Australian firms have built capabilities in cleaning up air, water and soil, recycling waste and 
eliminate pollution. These capabilities have proven increasingly relevant as environmental concerns increase. 
According to Smith (2007) linkages need not be directly into related manufacturing industries, but can also lead to 
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service sector development. In Australia the major financial markets in Sydney are heavily focused on specialised 
finance for the natural resource sector. Mining involves major risks, and the investment banking and equity markets in 
Australia are heavily involved in managing the risk spreading portfolio problems of the industry. This has over time, 
led to Sydney evolving into one of the major financial centres of the world which is partly owed to its background in 
natural resource-based industry (which continues to be one of its major specialisations). The Australian example also 
illustrates that there can be seemingly important linkages between primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Also here 
the importance of search and related learning was seen  
 
Text Box 9: Mineral discovery in Australia. 
 
Institutional aspects and status quo  
The institutional dimension of the resource-curse literature is the collection of arguments about why 
policy makers are not able to avoid the Dutch Disease, regulate labour markets, manage risk in 
relation to volatility in income, build linkages and diversify the productive structure. They are what 
Ross (1999) calls political explanations of the resource curse that complements the economic 
explanations.  
 
Resource curse proponents have a central argument that comes in several versions. The core of it is 
that ‘natural-resource abundance’ leads to myopia among private and public decision makers. The 
argument is ironically captured in the following quote by Jean Bodin: “Men of a fat and fertile soil, 
are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren country makes men 
temperate by necessity and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious” (Ross 1999: p. 6). 
This phenomenon has also been denoted “sugar mentality” and “boom-and-bust psychology”, 
which reflects that long-term planning and economic diversification are not on the agenda of 
decision makers in the presence of natural resource profits. Even though there seems to be little 
logical support for this argument it is proposed on several occasions by both Sachs and Warner 
(1995; 2001) and Gylfason (2001; 2004; 2008) when analysing the Dutch Disease. Furthermore, 
Humphreys, M., J. D. Sachs, et al. (2007) report that corruption is more widespread in ‘natural 
resource abundant’ countries because the short run availability of large financial assets increases the 
opportunity for the theft of such assets by political leaders. Also Auty (2001) argues for a negative 
relation between ‘natural-resource abundance’ and ‘developmental states’16
 
 (Woo-Cumings 1999) 
because: (a) high scarcity of land will force those in power to include the poor - there will be more 
pressure for redistribution; (b) scarcity of resources invites efficient use of them; (c) resource-scarce 
countries are less prone to trade policy closure and Dutch disease events because raw materials 
booms will not affect these economies much; (d) diversification into competitive manufacturing 
comes easier to resource poor nations due to (i) fewer opportunities in primary production, (ii) 
awareness of that a small natural resource-based industry can not support the rest of society. 
Thus, the basic argument is that ‘natural-resource abundance’ will give you ‘bad’ institutions. Still, 
some would argue that the absence of a developmental state causes ‘natural-resource abundance’ 
(absence of manufacture) and not the other way around – in other words that the ‘poor’ institutions 
are causes, and not results, of ‘natural-resource abundance’. 
 
This brings us back to the measurement of ‘natural-resource abundance’ – the value share of natural 
resource export in GDP. The denominator in this ratio is the size of the economy, and both the size 
of the economy and export specialisation is likely to be affected by past policy and institutions. This 
                                                 
16 A developmental state is seen as benevolent, capable and autonomous, and it seeks broad social welfare as part of a 
national vision without corruption and opportunistic rent-seeking behaviour.  
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implies that the measure is endogenous. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) sets out to test the 
resource curse propositions but adding institutional indicators to the regression17. They find a strong 
negative correlation between institution quality and ‘natural-resource abundance’ which they 
interpret to reflect that countries with poor institutions are unlikely to develop non-natural resource 
export goods. Thus, their finding is the reverse of the resource curse. Also, when controlling for the 
effects of institutions they find no significant (negative) correlation between ‘natural-resource 
abundance’ and income growth18
 
. These findings, that are also supported by Mehlum, Moene et al. 
(2006),  lead the Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) to conclude that the resource curse is a ‘red 
herring’. 
Despite these findings there is still disagreement on the direction of causality – an issue which has 
caused much debate on the primacy of institutions (Rodrik, Subramanian et al. 2004) versus 
geography (Diamond 1997; Gallup, Sachs et al. 1998; Sachs 2001). This is, according to Bridge 
(2008) and Gunton (2003), approximately where the discussion of natural resources and 
development stands today. Both proponents and critics agree that the correlation between ‘natural-
resource abundance’ and poor economic performance is primarily due to ‘state failure’ or 
‘governance failure’ (institutions). They disagree, though, on whether such failures are owed to 
context and contingency or to structural and deterministic features of natural resources. The 
consensus has implied that most debate on this issue pivots around the term ‘good governance’ and 
market-supporting institutions. Due to methodological problems with and the complex nature of 
institutions the research agenda has, according to Bridge (2008) and Gunton (2003), reached a 
stalemate. According to Gunton (2003) the consequence is that it remains undecided whether 
natural resources can lay the foundations for development or whether the structural limitations of 
natural resources will inevitably undermine development.  
 
Perspectives on institutions 
  
Even though it is a bad habit to talk of all the things that you do not do, I find it relevant to comment on the recent 
‘institutional turn’ in development economics because I will return to its core later on. Nielsen and Johnson (1998) 
identify two broad trends within institutional economics: (i) one emphasising institutional analysis with focus on 
‘allocation of scarce resources’, which is related to an equilibrium approach; and (ii) one focusing on the ‘creation, 
distribution and use of new resources’. The former can be denoted new institutional economics and the latter as old 
institutional economics (Hodgson 1998). 
 
The focus of new institutional economics in relation to topics of economic growth and development has mainly been 
on transaction costs where the prime goal is to reduce them (Aron 2000). The latter can be conceptualized as market-
supporting institutions. Rodrik (2000) identifies property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for macro 
stabilisation, institutions for social insurance and institutions for conflict management as important institutions 
supporting market efficiency. The argument is that these institutions, when ‘good’, will stimulate growth and 
development directly via diligent and efficient use of resources,  and indirectly via ‘good governance’ that will 
facilitate capital accumulation, investment, political stability, etc. (Aron 2000). Such considerations have stimulated 
                                                 
17 The authors use two proxies for institutional quality – they distinguish between (i) variable and (ii) invariable institutions. 
Variable institutions are short-term policy goals as governance while these activities are affected by ‘constitutional design’ 
and other ‘deeper’ framework conditions. The short-term outcomes are to some extent outputs from the deeper causes 
while the deeper institutions are outcomes of historical processes. The indicators are: (i-a) rule of law (World Bank data) – 
the quality of contract enforcement, police, courts and likelihood of violence and crime; (i-b) government effectiveness – 
quality of bureaucracy, and public services; (ii) the look at presidential regime versus parliamentary/majority-rule regimes. 
18 They use per capita income growth 1970-2000 and ‘natural-resource abundance’ data is averaged over the period 1970-
1989.  
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much research on the importance of institutions which, due to methodological problems, has not been able to conclude 
much more than ‘institutions do matter’ (Glaeser, La Porta et al. 2004; Johnson 2008)19
 
. The argument suggests that 
institutions are the root cause of development. This proposition may be true, but new institutional economics tends to 
focus on a rather limited set of institutions, which does not explicitly involve learning institutions.  
If one accepts that economic development is a process characterized by ‘creation, distribution and use of new 
resources’, there is reason to be sceptical towards claiming that minimisation of transaction costs is the root cause of 
development. Instead, one should focus on understanding how institutions affect processes of change, especially those 
that involve learning and capability building – learning institutions – as emphasized in parts of old institutional 
economics. Such a focus is needed in research on natural resources and development. Still, the arguments of new 
institutional economics are not irrelevant – there are obvious overlaps. Institutions contributing to collaboration and 
trust are relevant both for learning and e.g. low corruption.  
 
Text Box 10: Perspectives on institutions. 
 
A learning perspective on this debate could be fruitful for several reasons. Firstly, one problem with 
the current stalemate is that the discussion is dominated by new institutional economics that focuses 
on market-supporting institutions; see Text Box 10. The latter is a barrier for a deeper 
understanding of natural resource-based development. This approach is inadequate to grasp the 
dynamics involved in processes of creation and extension of natural resources which implies that 
researchers are not focusing on the most important parameters. It is strongly indicated in the 
historical examples that learning institutions are important in natural resource-based development – 
this calls for a learning perspective on natural resources. Clearly, several institutions that can also 
be perceived as market-supporting are important for building linkages as e.g. institutions insuring 
stability, access to credit, presence of human capital, and entrepreneurship.  
 
The above shows that institutions, rather than natural resources per se, to a large extent determine 
whether natural resource-based development is possible. It also shows that research on the topic 
unfortunately often focuses exclusively on market-supporting institutions. From a learning 
perspective such analysis can not address the most important challenges in natural resource-based 
development – for that a learning approach is required.    
7. Different Approaches 
This section will illustrate the different approaches and conceptual models for analysing natural 
resources that can be identified above. In the process a learning approach to natural resources will 
be explicitly presented. This exercise will make it clear that an alternative conceptual model of 
structural change is required to understand natural resource-based development. 
Endowment and process  
From the above review, it is clear that there does not seem to be any a priori reason to expect that 
natural resource-based industries (i) do not have and/or can not create linkages to other industries; 
(ii) per definition are subject to decreasing returns to scale due the finiteness of natural resources; 
(iii) do not experience learning and innovation; (iv), and therefore, can not lead development such 
                                                 
19 Performance measures are most often applied to indicate institutional quality and its link to economic performance. The 
performance of institutions can e.g. be indicated by risk measures and by the ease of doing business. This kind of data is 
obtained through surveys performed by private risk agencies as e.g. the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG - 
http://www.countrydata.com/datasets/). Data from the ICRG include subjective assessments of risk for international 
investors along dimensions as law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation by the government and 
risk of government contract repudiation.  
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that natural resource-based development is one potential strategy for development among and in 
combination with others.  
 
The main differences among proponents and critics in perception of natural resources (exogeneity 
and finiteness) are consequences of different analytical foci. If one perceives natural resources as 
exogenous and finite, then an obvious analytical focus would be to search for the most efficient use 
possible of these scarce resources. On the other hand, if one perceives natural resources as 
endogenous and non-finite such that scarcity changes with knowledge accumulation, then the 
analytical focus would also
Table 7-1
 include a search for understanding the processes of resource creation. If 
one wants to understand long-term development then it seems that to study allocation of current 
resources is less important than a dynamic perspective (c.f. ‘different perspectives on institutions’). 
The difference between the approaches can be conceptualized as an ‘endowment approach’ (static) 
and a ‘process approach’ (dynamic), see . To recognise these complementary differences 
is a first step in a learning approach to natural resources.   
 
Furthermore, in the endowment approach one focuses on the given stocks of resources at ones 
disposal. These are subject to prices that are mainly set by conditions of scarcity. Considering 
current and estimated future consumption together with current and estimated decrease in global 
supply, it is possible to establish a scenario wherefrom one can deduct at what time we will run out 
of a specific resource, and how price movements will be until then. Based on this information, it is 
possible to calculate an ‘optimal’ extraction and sales rate of energy resources, which maximizes 
income from deposits (see e.g. Hotelling 1931). This view implies that given endowments and 
demand, the price of energy will rise continuously as will the share of GDP going to energy 
consumption. Based on such a view W.S. Jevons (1866) argued in his publication ‘The Coal 
Question’ that: “I draw the conclusion that I think any one would draw, that we cannot long 
maintain our present rate of increase of consumption; that we can never advance to the higher 
amounts of consumption supposed. But this only means that the check to our progress must become 
perceptible considerably within a century from the present time; that the cost of fuel must rise, 
perhaps within a lifetime, to a rate threatening our commercial and manufacturing supremacy; and 
the conclusion is inevitable, that our present happy progressive condition is a thing of limited 
duration”. The situation would have looked different in a process approach where it is recognised 
that (a) deposits of energy often increases significant via improved search, (b) sources of energy has 
often changed (in modern economies), (c) it is important to search for substitute sources, (d) the 
ability to change energy sources is partly determined by prior innovation and capabilities, (e) 
energy is a source of competitiveness wherefore productivity in extraction and conversion is 
important, and (f) experiences and incomes from the process of energy resource utilisation may be 
used to build new competences in activities, which are not immediately related to these resources 
(Rosenberg 1976).  
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Parameter Endowment approach  Process approach 
Finiteness  Natural resources are finite and thus subject to 
‘decreasing returns to scale’. The main question to 
consider is optimal resource management, which 
implies ‘good’ governance in order to extract and sell 
resources such that value is maximized given market 
prices. Income should be invested in manufacturing 
or service activities.    
Not necessarily finite or exhaustible – would 
give a wrong perception of natural resources. 
Natural resources should be understood as a 
dynamic concept as they can be created, 
extended and destroyed via knowledge 
accumulation.   
Linkages  
 
Natural resources are freely available in nature, go 
directly to consumers or as inputs to industrial 
activities. There is thus very little feedback with 
industry or production function – even with ‘good’ 
institutions. 
There are significant linkages across the 
tripartite classification that differ over time 
and place in intensity.  
Learning  
 
Because of decreasing returns to scale and absence of 
linkages learning potential is limited. 
Natural resources are not freely available. 
Extension and creation of them requires 
learning and competence building.  
Exogenous 
or 
endogenous?  
Natural resources should be seen as an exogenous, 
independent stock of raw material without relevance 
for the ‘societal production function’.  
 
Natural resources are clearly endogenous 
because of their dependence upon stock of 
knowledge. In some sense natural resources is 
a social.  
Table 7-1: Endowment versus process approach to natural resources.  
 
Theoretical nuances  
In order to give an overview and to illustrate how a learning perspective can contribute to the 
existing literature on natural resource-based development, further theoretical differences and 
nuances, and the problems with these will be pointed out, see Table 7-2. 
 
The aspect that separates the staple theory (that sees natural resources as a temporary advantage) 
and proponents of the resource curse is the different view on linkage potential. However, they share 
the view on the finiteness of natural resources, and thus the understanding that they are subject to 
decreasing returns to scale. Both Watkins (1963) and Gunton (2003) are exponents of the latter 
position20
 
. Gunton argues that natural resource-based development (staples) is possible especially in 
the early phases of development. Staple theory acknowledges that primary production can have 
linkages with secondary and tertiary production, but it tends to underestimate, and maybe ignore, 
aspects of resource creation, extension, obsolescing and innovation – activities that also call for 
learning, investment, equipment and thus further linkages. Thus, to keep intact the perception of 
natural resources as being finite, will exclude part of the linkage potential. Instead, when one views 
natural resource as a dynamic concept, there is no general argument for why natural resources 
should not be able to lead a development process over long time periods – also, while other, and 
maybe unrelated, industries emerge in the national economy.  
Furthermore, the resource-curse literature can with respect to institutions be divided into, broadly 
speaking, two positions: (i) natural-resource abundance gives you bad institutions or (ii) bad 
institutions give you natural-resource abundance; and poverty. While position (i) argues that natural 
resources are cursed and will harm your economy, position (ii) argues that natural resources are not 
cursed as such, but since it is a type of production which is subject decreasing returns to scale, it can 
                                                 
20 Staple theory contains much diversity (Gunton 2003), which is not reviewed in full here. Nonetheless, I base this 
proposition mainly on Watkins (1963) and Gunton (2003) who both make literature reviews of prior contributions to staple 
theory, and reflect the mainstream of writings. 
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not lead development. Additionally, position (ii) argues that if a country has ‘good’ (market-
supporting) institutions, then it has a chance to export its natural resources to earn foreign income to 
invest in manufacturing – to escape the resource curse. Regardless of the inclusion of institutions, 
the nature of natural resources seems to be misunderstood in these arguments.    
 
 (a) Resource curse 
literature   
(b) Institutional 
resource curse  
(c) Staple theory (d) Learning 
approach  
Is natural 
resource-based 
development 
possible? 
No, natural resource-
based activities are 
harmful for 
development 
No, natural resource-
based  industries can 
not create 
development; only 
finance it 
Yes, but only as a 
transitory in the early 
phases of development  
Yes, the reviewed 
material suggests the 
possibility of natural 
resource-based 
development   
Exogenous or 
endogenous? 
Exogenous Exogenous Endogenous (linkages) Endogenous (linkages) 
Are natural 
resources 
finite? 
Yes, endowment 
approach + decreasing 
returns to scale 
Yes, endowment 
approach + decreasing 
returns to scale   
Yes, endowment 
approach + decreasing 
returns to scale 
No, process approach 
to natural resources 
The role of 
institutions 
Natural-resource 
abundance leads to 
‘bad’ institutions 
‘Bad’ (market-
supporting) 
institutions lead to 
natural-resource 
abundance 
(specialisation in 
natural resource-based 
industry) 
Build linkages, avoid 
caveats (no explicit 
reference to 
institutions) 
It is important to 
primarily focus on 
learning institutions 
because knowledge is 
the main barrier to 
linkage building 
(Hirschman 1981). 
Relationship 
between 
natural 
resources and 
secondary and 
tertiary 
sectors? 
Contradiction Co-existence Temporary co-
evolution 
Co-evolution 
Policy 
consequences 
Get out of natural 
resource-based 
industry 
With ‘good’ (market-
supporting) 
institutions it is 
possible to avoid the 
resource curse, and 
obtain export income 
to invest in 
manufacturing. 
Staple trap can be 
avoided with clever 
policy, invest export 
earnings in 
manufacturing.  
Be careful with 
generalisations, and 
explore the role of 
natural resources in 
specific contexts. 
Focus on linkages, 
‘good’ and learning 
institutions  
Table 7-2: Theoretical approaches to natural resources - an overview. 
 
These differences in perceptions can be seen in Table 7-2. The issue of linkages is formulated as the 
relationship between natural resource-based industries and the rest of the economic system, and can 
be defined as one of contradiction, one of co-existence or one of co-evolution. According to the 
resource curse natural resources are directly harmful for other economic production (contradiction). 
According to the institutional version of the resource curse, natural resources can not lead 
development, but can mobilize finance – so the sectors can co-exist without problems. Partly in 
staple theory and, fully in a learning perspective, natural resources co-evolve with the development 
of other types of production via processes of linkages building and learning, innovation and 
competence building.    
 
In the above table Reinert’s (2007) dichotomy outlined earlier is accepted only by groups (a) and 
(b), partly by (c), but fully rejected by position (d). Basically, the shift from a static, exogenous 
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perception of natural resources to a dynamic, endogenous perception undermines the validity of the 
dichotomy. Since the dichotomy is also part of the micro foundations for the tripartite conceptual 
model, then it should be revised to be capable of incorporating the view on natural resources 
presented above. Moreover, the table above clearly illustrates how and with what a learning 
perspective can contribute to the literature on natural resources and development.  
8. Concluding remarks 
The empirical examples and theoretical arguments presented indicate that natural resource-based 
industries may play an important role in economic development via linkages of different nature and 
via learning and innovation. The tripartite model has little to say about the process of change. It is 
too general and relies on co-observation of events rather than posing a causal sequence of events. 
As was said by Cohen and Zysman (1987) earlier, the latter model is not a theory or an economic 
model. Instead it is a popular hypothesis without real theory. To get beyond these crude co-
observations one must focus on the processes of change to find out what ‘drives’ structural change 
and development. As a mean towards that end a learning approach to natural resources has been 
presented. Its core proposition is that natural resources must be understood as dynamic, and as 
being subject to learning processes of natural resource creation, extension and obsolescing that are 
enabled or blocked by institutions. 
 
The latter suggests that there is no a priori hierarchy of industries. Therefore the resource curse is 
not really about natural resources but about learning – or the absence of it. Natural resources do not 
make countries poor, but weak learning systems do. These insights do not disqualify all insights 
from the resource curse, though. It is important to avoid ‘enclave industries’ with weak demand and 
fiscal linkages, and with limited backward and forward linkages. Still, these considerations do, at 
best, allow for perceiving natural resources and e.g. manufacturing as co-existing activities. One 
needs a learning perspective to perceive the potential for co-evolution and development in natural 
resource-based industries.   
 
Seen from this perspective it is crucial to understand how learning takes place in natural resource-
based industries and how these affect structural change and development. As pointed to by 
Hirschman (1981) and indicated by the successful examples of natural resource-based development, 
knowledge accumulation and linkage building are crucial factors in the process. This makes it 
obvious to focus on the causality between development, structural change and innovation. Given the 
systemic nature of learning the innovation system approach might be well-suited for approaching 
the latter challenge (see e.g. Lundvall, B.-Å., J. Vang, et al. 2009). 
 
 
9. Literature 
Andersen, E. S. (1992). Approaching National Systems of Innovation from the Production and 
Linkage Structure. National systems of innovation : toward a theory of innovation and interactive 
learning. B. Å. Lundvall, London: Pinter. 
Anderson, K. (1998). "Are resource-abundant economies disadvantaged?" The Australian Journal 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Arocena, R. and J. Sutz (2000b). "Looking at National Systems of Innovation from the South." 
 42(1). 
Industry and Innovation 7: 55-75. 
Globelics 2011  draft 
 
33 
 
Aron, J. (2000). "Growth and institutions: A review of the evidence." World Bank Research 
Observer
Auty, R. M. (2001). "The political economy of resource-driven growth." 
 15(1). 
European Economic 
Review
Baffes, J. and T. Haniotis (2010). Placing the 2006/08 Commodity Price Boom into Perspective. 
 45. 
Policy Research Working Paper
Bakker, K. and G. Bridge (2006). "Material worlds? Resource geographies and the 'matter of 
nature'." 
, The World Bank. 
Progress in Human Geograpy
Black, J. (2003). 
 30(1). 
Oxford dictionary of economics
Boulding, K. E. (1978). 
, Oxford University Press. 
Ecodynamics: A New Theory of Societal Evolution
Boulding, K. E. (1981). Evolutionary Economics. London, Sage Publications. 
, Sage Publications. 
Bridge, G. (2008). "Global production networks and the extractive sector: governing resource-based 
development " Journal of Economic Geography 8. 
Browning, M. (2008). Engel's Law. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online
Brunnschweiler, C. N. and E. H. Bulte (2008). "The resource curse revisited: A tale of paradoxes 
and red herrings." 
. S. N. 
Durlauf and L. E. Blume., Palgrave Macmillan. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Cappelen, Å. and L. Mjøset (2009). Can norway be a role model for natural-resource abundant 
countries? Research paper, UNU-WIDER. 
 55. 
Ciccone, Antonio (2008) Linkages. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Eds. Steven N. 
Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Palgrave Macmillan.  
Cimoli, M., G. Porcile, et al. (2005). Cambio Estructural, Heterogeneidad Productiva y Tecnología 
en América Latina, CEPAL. 
Cohen, S. S. and Zysman, J. (1987). Manufacturing matters: the myth of the post-industrial 
economy. New York : Basic Books. 
Coriat, B. and Dosi, G., 1998, The Institutional Embeddedness of Economic Change, in Nielsen, K. 
and Johnson, B. (eds) Institutions and Economic Change, New Perspectives on Markets, Firms and 
technology, Edward Elgar.  
Dahl Andersen, Allan (2009). ‘Getting the Economic Activities Right - The Case of the Brazilian 
Sugarcane-ethanol Industry’. Presented at DRUID-DIME Academy Winter Conference 2009   
Daly, H. E. (1997). "Georgescu-Roegen versus Solow/Stiglitz." Ecological Economics
Diamond, J. (1997). 
 22. 
Guns, Germs, and Steel
Dosi, G. (1988). "Sources, Procedures and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation." Journal of 
Economic Literature 26(3). 
. New York, W.W. Norton & Co. 
Easterlin, R. A. (2008). Simon Kuznets (1901–1985). The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
Online. S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume., Palgrave Macmillan. 
Edquist, C. and B. Johnson (1997). Institutions and Organizations in Systems of Innovation. 
Systems of Innovation. C. Edquist. London, Pinter. 
Globelics 2011  draft 
 
34 
 
Fagerberg, J., D. C. Mowery, et al. (2009). "The evolution of Norway’s national innovation 
system." Science and Public Policy 36. 
Ferranti, D. d., G. E. Perry, et al. (2002). From Natural Resources to the Knowledge Economy. 
World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Washington, D.C., World Bank. 
Findlay, R. (2008). Terms of trade. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online
Fisher, Allan G. B. (1939).’Production, Primary, secondary and Tertiary’. Economic Society of 
Australia and New Zealand, Economic Record. 
. S. N. 
Durlauf and L. E. Blume., Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fisher, Allan G. B. (1952). ‘A note on tertiary production’. The Economic Journal, vol. 62, no. 244, 
pp 820-834. 
Galeano, E. (1971). Open veins of Latin America
Gallup, J. L., J. D. Sachs, et al. (1998). Geography and Economic Development. 
, Monthly Review Press. 
NBER Working 
Paper
Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas (1975). ‘Energy and Economic Myths’. Southern Economic Journal, 
Vol. 41, No. 3.  
. 
Glaeser, E. L., R. La Porta, et al. (2004). Do institutions cause growth? NBER working paper
Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2001).’Natural Resources, Education, and Economic Development’. 
European Economic Review 45. 
, 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gylfason, T. (2004). Natural resources and economics growth:From dependence to diversification. 
Discussion Paper. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2008). ‘Dutch Disease’. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd 
edition, 2008.  
Hirschman, A. (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, Conn., Yale 
University press. 
Hirschman, Albert (1981). ‘A generalized linkage approach to development, with special reference 
to staples’. In Essays in Trespassing. Cambridge University Press.  
Hodgson, G. M. 1998, The Approaches of Institutional economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 
, Vol. XXXVI  
Hotelling, Harold (1931). ‘The Economics of Exhaustible Resources’. The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 39, pp. 137-175. 
Humphreys, M., J. D. Sachs, et al. (2007). What is the problem with natural resource wealth? 
Escaping the resource curse. M. Humphreys, J. D. Sachs and J. E. Stiglitz. New York, Columbia 
University. 
Innis, H. (1930). The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History 
Innis, H. (1940). 
University of Toronto Press (1999 edition). 
The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy. Toronto, The 
Ryerson Press. 
Globelics 2011  draft 
 
35 
 
Jevons, W. S. (1866). The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation, and 
the Probable Exhaustion of Our Coal-Mines. Chapter 12. , London, Macmillan and Co. 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/The_Coal_Question_%28e-book%29. 
Johnson, B. (1992). Institutional Learning. National Innovation Systems: Towards A Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning
Johnson, B. (2008). A note on institutions as the root cause of development. 
. B. Å. Lundvall. London, Pinter. 
Workshop on 
Institutions, Innovation and Development
Kaufmann, D. and  Kraay, A. (2007), Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be 
Going?, Policy Research Working Paper 4370. The World Bank.  
, Department of Business Studies, Aalborg University. 
Knaup, H. and J. v. Mittelstaedt (2009). The new colonialism - Foreign investors snap up African 
farmland. Spiegel International
Krugman, P. (1979). "Increasing returns, monopolistic competition and international trade." 
. 
Journal 
of International Economics
Krugman, P. (1997). 
 9. 
Development, Geography, and Economic Theory
Kuznets, Simon (1971). Economic growth of nations: total output and production structure. 
Cambridge (Mass.)London: Belknap Press of Harvard University  
, MIT Press  
Lundvall, B. Å. (2007). "National Innovation Systems Analytical Concept and Development Tool." 
Industry and Innovation 14(1). 
Lundvall, B.-Å., J. Vang, et al. (2009). Innovation system research and developing countries. 
Handbook of innovation systems and developing countries - building domestic capabilities in a 
global setting
Malthus, Thomas (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population.  
. B. Å. Lundvall, K. J. Joseph, C. Chaminade and J. Vang, Edward Elgar. 
Marshall, Alfred. (1890), The Principles of Economics, Macmillan. 
Matsuyama, Kiminori (1992). ‘Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and economic 
growth’. Journal of Economic Theory, 58, 317-334.  
Matsuyama, K. (2008). Structural change. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.
Mehlum, H., K. Moene, et al. (2006). "Institutions and the resource curse." 
 S. N. 
Durlauf and L. E. Blume, Palgrave Macmillan. 
The Economic Journal
Nielsen, K. and B. Johnson (1998). 
 
116. 
Institutions and economic change : New perspectives on 
markets, firms and technology
Palma, J. G. (2008a). De-industrialization, ‘premature’ de-industrialization and the Dutch Disease. 
. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, Incorporated. 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online
Palma, J. G. (2008b). Raúl Prebisch (1901–1986). 
. S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume., Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
Online
Prebisch, R. (1950). 
. S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume., Palgrave Macmillan. 
The economic development of Latin America and its principal problems
Reinert, E. (2007). How Rich Countries Got Rich ... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor, 
PublicAffairs. 
. New 
York, United Nations Publications. 
Globelics 2011  draft 
 
36 
 
Rodrik, D. (2000). "Institutions for high-quality growth: what they are and how to acquire them." 
Studies in Comparative International Development
Rodrik, D. (2006). "Goodbye Washington Consensus, hello Washington Confusion? A review of 
the World Bank's Economic growth in the 1990s: Learning from a decade of reform." 
 35(3). 
Journal of 
Economic Literature
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian, et al. (2004). "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over 
Geography and Integration in Economic Development." 
 44(4). 
Journal of Economic Growth
Rollins, C. E. (1971). Mineral Development and Economic Growth. 
 9. 
Imperialism and 
Underdevelopment
Rosenberg, Nathan (1976). Perspectives on Technology.  ISBN: 0521290112 and 978052129011 
. R. I. Rhodes. New York, Monthly Review Press. 
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1995). ‘Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’. 
NBER Working paper series, paper no. 5398.  
Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner (1997). Natural resource abundance and economic growth, Center for 
International Development and Harvard Institute for International Development. 
Sachs, J. D. (2001). Tropical Underdevelopment. NBER Working Paper
Scitovsky, T. (1976). 
. 
The Joyless Economy – An Inquiry into Human Satisfaction and Consumer 
Dissatisfaction
Singer, H. W. (1950). "The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries." 
, ISBN: 0-19-501974-1. 
The 
American Economic Review
Smith, K. (2002). What is the ‘Knowledge Economy’? Knowledge Intensity and Distributed 
Knowledge Bases Discussion Paper Series, United Nations University, INTECH. 
 40(2). 
Smith, K. (2007). Innovation and Growth in Resource-based Economies, Australian Innovation 
Research Centre, University of Tasmania. 
Smith, Keith (2008). ‘Climate change and radical energy innovation: the policy issues’. Report to 
Garnaut Commission on Climate Change, Department of Premier and Cabinet Government of 
Victoria, Australia.  
Solow, R. M. (1957). "Technical change and the aggregate production function." The Review of 
Economics and Statistics
Spiegel International (2009). ‘Foreign Investors Snap up African Farmland’. July 30th. 
 39(3). 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,639224,00.html  
UNCTAD (2007). World investment report - Transnational corporations, extractive industries and 
development, United Nations. 
Watkins, M. H. (1963). "A staple theory of economic growth." The Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Political Science
Watkins, M. H. (1977). "The staple theory revisited." 
 29(2). 
Journal of Canadian Studies
Wicken, Olav (2009). ‘The theoretical basis of resource based dynamics: Are natural resources 
endogenous or exogenous of the economy?’. Working paper. TIK. Oslo University. 
 12. 
Woo-Cumings, M. (1999). The developmental state, Cornell University Press. 
Globelics 2011  draft 
 
37 
 
Wright, G. and J. Czelusta (1997). "Increasing returns and the genesis of american resource 
abundance." Industrial and Corporate Change 6. 
Wright, G. and J. Czelusta (2002). Exorcizing the resource curse: Minerals as a knowledge industry, 
past and present. Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of economics. 25 1 
Wright, G. and J. Czelusta (2004). "Why economies slow - The myth of the resource curse." 
Challenge 47(2). 
Zimmermann (1972). World Resources and Industries. Third edition. Harper & Row Publishers, 
New York.  
 
 
